REPORTS

REPORTS

Cedar Revolution Reloaded
- Lebanon between Internal Paralysis and Regional Confrontation

Report by Heiko Wimmen (hbf Middle East Office Beirut)

Since November 2006, a standoff between the government of Prime Minister Fuad Seniora and the opposition led by the Shiite Hizballah and the Christian “Free Patriotic Movement” (FPM) has paralyzed the institutions of the Lebanese state. While essentially not over sectarian issues, the conflict has assumed an increasingly sectarian character as sectarian identities are more and more converging with opposing political approaches. In particular, tensions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims have prompted violent clashes at the end of January, when automatic weapons were used on the streets of Beirut for the first time since the end of the Civil War in 1991. There is serious concern that with a prolonged confrontation such tensions may spin out of control, in particular if mounting regional tension between the US, Israel, Syria and Iran once again turn the military capabilities of Hizballah into a strategic issue.

1 – FROM ENTHUSIASM TO TURMOIL: A TALE OF TWO REVOLUTIONS

Downtown Beirut has been under a peaceful siege since early December: parliament and council of ministers are cordoned off by barbed wire; military is deployed on strategic crossings. Beyond the security perimeter, a tent city houses several thousands of mainly young protesters, encamped right in the heart of (now deserted) high-end shopping areas, where they spend days and nights with drums, hookahs and the intonation of political slogans against the government. During two massive demonstrations in early December, streets and squares were drowned in a sea of white-and-red Lebanese flags.

Such images (minus the barbed wire) have made the news before: two years ago, after the assassination of the charismatic former prime minister and billionaire Rafik El-Hariri, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese took to the streets and forced the withdrawal of the Syrian army and the resignation of the pro-Syrian government. Enthusiasts already saw the advent of a wave of popular pro-democracy movements sweeping the Middle East, similar to the events in Eastern Europe in the late 80ies.

Riding on the momentum of the “Cedar Revolution”, a coalition of Sunni-Muslim, Druze and Christian parties gathered under the label “March 14” (the date of the largest demonstration in the spring of 2005) were able to score a significant victory in parliamentary elections, and managed to include even the Shiite, pro-Syrian Hizballah in a new government.[1] However, tensions between the uneven partners have been on the rise ever since, in particular over the establishment of an international court to try the assassins of Rafik El-Hariri and Hizballah’s armed presence in the South.

“March 14” suffered a significant setback when the “Free Patriotic Movement” of Michel Aoun, formerly one of the main pillars of the “Cedar Revolution”, entered into a formal alliance with Hizballah in December 2005.[2] In addition to the overwhelming majority of the Shiite community – who make up for at least one third the Lebanese population -, the government of prime minister Fuad Seniora, which is mainly based on the Sunni-Muslim community led by the Hariri family, is now also opposed by a large proportion, possibly a majority of Lebanese Christians.[3]

2 – FROM WAR TO WAR OF WORDS

Even before the summer war of 2006 between Hizballah and Israel, the political process had thus ground to a standstill, which several sessions of a so-called “national dialogue“ involving all key players in late spring were unable to resolve. The war however, after a short spell of solidarity in the face of the Israeli attack, brought the differences to the forefront to an unprecedented extent. Initially veiled, but increasingly outspoken allegations by Hizballah claimed that the government majority colluded with the attacks in order to see Hizballah cut to size. Declaring that the Seniora administration could no longer be trusted, Hizballah and its allies thus demanded a larger representation in the government that would give it a blocking minority vote of one third plus one of the cabinet posts. According to the opposition, such veto power would serve as a guarantee that the majority could no longer ignore objections from the opposition – as it did on the issue of the tribunal -, and would thus assure “real partnership” in governing the country. However, the central rational for Hizballah to seek such veto power is clearly the concern that “March 14” may use its current solid majorities in both cabinet and parliament to push through decisions detrimental to the military capacity of the party.[4]

“Now we are demanding it [a greater share of cabinet posts] because our experience during the war and the performance of the government has made us unsure. On several occasions they pressured us to lay down our weapons while we were fighting the war. So after the war, we had no choice but to demand this guarantee that would give us legal and constitutional strength. If we take one-third plus one, the government will not be able to impose its decision on us.”[5]

3 – CONSTITUTIONAL DEADLOCK

Finally, on November 11, the ministers fielded by Hizballah and the likewise Shiite Amal Movement led by the speaker of parliament Nabih Berri resigned when a vote on the Hariri-Tribunal appeared imminent. President Emile Lahoud (considered pro-Syrian and pro-opposition) declared that, since the government was now lacking any Shiite minister, it was in breach of constitutional requirements providing for the representation of all major sects, and thus unconstitutional and illegitimate. Since then, both the president and the speaker of parliament have been boycotting the government and refuse to process draft laws or government decisions.[6]

As a result, the confrontation between the two camps has led to a near to total paralysis of the political system. Due to the Lebanese system of sectarian checks and balances, an alliance of the president of the republic and the speaker of parliament is practically capable of blocking or stalling any decision taken by the government indefinitely. Irrespective of the validity of the constitutional claims and the practical effects of the street protests, the rump government of Fuad Seniora is thus unable to govern, leave alone to implement the extensive reform plans and commitments on which the pledges received at the donor conference in Paris on January 25, 2007 were conditioned.

4 – STRATEGIES AND DISCOURSES OF THE TWO CAMPS

According to the majority camp, the core conflict is located in Hizballah’s attempt to undermine the international Hariri-tribunal in order to protect the Syrian regime from indictment. So far, there is little indication that the international investigation under prosecutor Serge Brammertz has indeed accumulated sufficient evidence to support such an indictment. Nevertheless, the Syrian regime remains apprehensive that the US may exploit the tribunal to further isolate Damascus and exert concessions. While portraying Hizballah as a mere tool of Syrian foreign policy is certainly exaggerated and reductionist, Hizballah cannot ignore such concerns.

“On a matter of vital important to Damascus and at a time of increased pressure on Hizballah to disarm, it is virtually impossible for the movement not to oblige. Hizballah’s arms supply transits through Syria; during the war, Syria reportedly provided other critical assistance, including shelter for cadres and family. […] Given heightened regional polarization and Hizballah’s commitment to an ideologically militant stance, any weakening of Syria also inevitably would undermine its own position.”[7]

Such loyalty comes at a high political price: it allows the majority to constantly remind the public of Hizballah’s ties to Syria and its own historic achievement of ousting the big neighbor; undermines the party’s nationalist credentials and forces Hizballah to spend precious political capital to defend a position with little public appeal. Even more importantly, accusing their opponents of protecting the killers of the Sunni leader Hariri helps to coagulate support among their mainly Sunni constituency. After the assassination of the Christian Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, this argument also serves to undermine Michel Aoun’s position in the Christian camp. Combined with a political discourse drawing upon sectarian resentment (fueled in particular by the events in Iraq) and the perennial fear of Lebanon’s Sunnis of losing their position in the Muslim camp to a growing and militant Shiite community, this narrative works to neutralize Hizballah’s nationalist, pro-Palestinian and anti-American discourse, for which a significant part of the Sunni public is traditionally susceptible.[8]

According to this view, Hizballah and its allies are mere tools of Iranian (i.e. Shiite and non-Arab) interests, and Iranian support for Arab causes (e.g. Palestine) is of a purely tactical nature, part of an Iranian gamble for a “grand bargain” through which the US will acknowledge its position as a regional power at the expense of Washington’s traditional Arab allies, e.g. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf Emirates.[9] The government stresses the legitimacy it wields as representative of the parliamentary majority, describes the popular mobilization mounted by the opposition as an attempt to reverse the result of democratic elections that is tantamount to a coup, and presents itself a as guarantor of stability and foreign support for postwar reconstruction, expressed in particular through the donor pledges achieved at the Paris conference on January 25, 2007. It has constantly warned that the mass mobilization launched by the opposition may incite civil and sectarian strife, a scenario that was vindicated by clashes on January 23 and 25, 2007 that left at least seven dead and several hundred wounded.[10]

In the eyes of the opposition, the government majority has abandoned the agreement struck between Hizballah/Amal, Druze leader Walid Jumblat, the Hariris and the Lebanese Forces (the Christian faction led by Samir Geagea) at the eve of the 2005 elections, whereby Hizballah’s right to resistance would not be touched (the majority would retort that Hizballah has proved itself to be undeserving of the trust invested in its handling of the “resistance” by triggering a war, and has therefore destroyed the basis of this accord). Accordingly, at least a part of the parliamentary representatives loyal to the majority are seen as betraying the political preferences of the people who voted them into office.[11] Furthermore, the opposition claims that the electoral law applied in 2005 favored the current majority, which according to this view today only represents a minority of the population. Hizballah depicts the majority as mere tools of Western (and particularly American) strategic designs aimed at securing control over the region and its resources. Such arguments which, as a result of historical experience and ideological mobilization, enjoy a high default credibility within the Shiite community, are supported by the explicit and vocal support for the Seniora government expressed by high American officials, and even president George W. Bush in his latest „State of the Union” address, and are widely accepted beyond the Shiite camp (secular groups such as the communist party and other leftists and nationalists, but also Sunnis of pan-Arab orientation). Recently corroborated reports about a new American strategy aimed at forging an alliance of “moderate” Arab governments against a camp of “extremists“ led by Iran,[12] and anti-Shiite statements by several rulers of this (predominantly Sunni) “alliance of moderates” such as Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Jordan’s Abdallah II and Saudi Arabia’s Abdallah Ben Abdelaziz exacerbate fears of sectarian conflict throughout the region and lead to a closing of the ranks even among secular Shiites with Western education and liberal leanings.

Among the Christian opposition, criticism focuses on corruption and clientelism, attached in particular to the Hariris and Druze leader Walid Jumblat. In particular the Aounist “Free Patriotic Movement” emphasizes the implication of key figures of the current administration – and especially PM Fuad Seniora – in past fiscal and economic policies that led to the current economic difficulties and the spiraling public debt (currently more than 40 billion US-Dollar; almost 200 % of GDP). Given their past record, the opposition considers the current government as not suitable or capable to implement genuine reform. While clearly populist in style and substance, such criticism of the government’s performance is also echoed by neutral observers:

“Politically, the Lebanese government must move beyond its short term concern with holding on to power and show that it can bring about political reform. This means a fuller implementation of the Taif agreement,[13] including passing overdue election and administrative decentralization bills. The government must also do more to show its commitment to fighting corruption and improving the civil and armed services; Hizballah has pointed to the weaknesses of the Lebanese army and state in the past to justify its own existence.”[14]

5 – SQUARING THE CIRCLE: HIZBALLAH BETWEEN LEBANESE DEMOCRACY AND REGIONAL RESISTANCE

The central question driving the current crisis, besides which all other issues – such as the Hariri-Tribunal or the implementation of economic reforms – appear secondary (and solvable) remains beyond any doubt the political choices and approaches of Hizballah: Will the party restrict its objectives to the Lebanese arena and act as a political party representing the interests of a community, a party who seeks majorities or compromise to achieve its objectives, including foreign policy? Or will it pursue a regional agenda, considering itself part of a larger force or axis of “resistance” (against American and Israeli designs), an objective to which domestic policy issues remain subordinate, which is not conditional on domestic approval and runs the risk of involving Lebanon in regional conflicts? In a programmatic paper published right after the summer war in August 2006, the director of the Hizballah think tank Center for Studies and Documentation Ali Fayyad strives to square the circle between Lebanese democracy and regional resistance:

“The success of the resistance movement in its domestic role constitutes in itself a contribution to the overall objectives of the resistance because the regional balances are all inter-related. Within this vision, the supposed contradiction between the domestic and regional roles of the resistance movement that usually raises many sensitivities and complexities, no longer exists. […] This means that the Lebanese national interests are the essential criterion for the behavior of the resistance movement. Its contribution to the regional struggle thus becomes an automatic result of its successes at the national level.”[15]

Such statements, and recent declarations by Hizballah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah that the party would be prepared to give up its arsenal once a “capable, powerful and just state” was established, have led some observers to believe that the party would be ready to trade its resistance role against reforms and an overhaul of the Lebanese political system, in particular a stronger role for the Shiite community.[16] Yet, it remains highly questionable how Hizballah would perform such a shift from “resistance“ as the linchpin of its ideological identity and mass appeal to a narrow sectarian agenda, a role for which it has shown utter disdain in the past. Moreover, the question remains who, and within what limits and according to which rules, would define the “Lebanese National Interest“, quoted by Fayyad as “the essential criterion for the behavior of the resistance movement”, and according to which criteria the state would be judged as “powerful, capable and just”? If, after the implementation of reforms, a parliamentary majority, elected in new elections held under a modernized law, as Hizballah demands, were to decide that the national interest demands an end to the resistance and its disarmament, or even Lebanon’s alignment with the pro-American “alliance of moderates“ - would the party comply? The behavior of Hizballah since 2005, the party literature as well as public statements and opinions expressed by high-ranking party members[17] leave little room for doubt that on issues such as these, the party will continue to claim the right to define the national interest according to principles that will not be subordinated to a majority vote, and that resistance, on the (interrelated) domestic and regional level, and therefore the discretionary decision over acts that may potentially involve Lebanon in armed conflict, remains its inalienable right and religious duty, and that any attempt to thwart it will be construed as hostile and a priori against the national interest. For a state to be accepted as “just and capable” by Hizballah, a lasting consensus against any such tendencies would have to be achieved, and possibly even cemented by institutional guarantees.[18]

“The Shiites and Hizballah believe that they cannot consider themselves free, even if they have internal freedoms, even if they have individual freedoms, even if they have greater representation, if they are not free from Israeli-US hegemony. Therefore their priority remains confronting American-Israeli ambitions, by the force of their arms or the threat of their arms. Political representation is secondary; it always has been and continues to be. Hizballah claims, and I think I would buy into this, that the US has on many occasions lured them with greater political representation if they would lay down their arms and they have consistently refused to do so. Again, here we have to think: what are the objectives of greater political representation? It is to pursue their agenda. In their opinion, they can pursue this agenda more effectively with their arms than with parliamentary representation.”[19]

Finally, Hizballah, at least according to the published opinions of its intellectual leaders, is feeling reassured that in the current political war of attrition, time is on its side. Arguing the exceedingly obvious American failure in Iraq and growing war-weariness in the US, the deputy head of the Hizballah think tank Center for Studies and Documentation Abdelhalim Fadlallah expects a fundamental shift in American and Western policy in the region, away from direct intervention and regime change and towards realpolitik and the recognition of regional players in order to preserve strategic and economic interests.

“The Lebanese rulers should be aware of the real dimensions of what is happening in the region, before they venture into attaching themselves to one “axis” and distance themselves from the other. This “axis of moderation” is merely a tactical move in a greater battle, designed to fill the void while awaiting comprehensive agreements, or major clashes. The opposing axis however is the kernel of a regional, self-motivated system built on cooperation between those societies in the region that are still capable of taking the initiative.”[20]

6 – REGIONALIZATION OR ESCALATION?

Practically since the early days of the crisis, an intensive shuttle diplomacy, involving mainly Saudi and Iranian diplomats in addition to the secretary general of the Arab league Amr Moussa, has sought to negotiate a solution formula that would be face-saving for all involved parties – so far with inconclusive results. Elaborate compromises – such as a new cabinet line-up with differential voting rights that would guarantee veto power for all – were circulated at times, only to fall off the agenda shortly afterwards for no apparent reason. Already the sheer complexity of the issues at stake – makeup of a new government, early elections under a new law (in and by itself an issue that traditionally spawns protracted debate), electing a new president (the extended term of Emile Lahoud expires at the end of the year) and the international tribunal, and also the sequence in which these issues would be tackled – makes such a compromise solution an extremely difficult undertaking. Moreover, there is ample reason to doubt that a merely formal compromise will defuse the crisis in a sustainable way. Rather, such a compromise, even if achieved, will soon be disrupted again as long as the fundamental question of Lebanon’s position and orientation in the regional conflict remains unsolved and an object of highly charged contention.

Accordingly, the current crisis may well drag on into the summer, entailing further damage for the already battered economy, and likely compelling the opposition to step up its protests even further in order to preserve the political momentum. In an already highly charged atmosphere, such a protracted standoff and further mobilization may well prompt new clashes between the supporters of the two camps. While the Lebanese Army has so far – wisely – refused to take sides in the conflict and restricted itself to separating the clashing sides, supporters of the governing majority who see themselves faced with a well-equipped fighting force on the other side and feel that they cannot rely on the army to defend “their” quarters against possible attacks, may feel compelled to organize their own fighting units.

Such tensions could be exacerbated by mounting regional tensions, if the shift in the regional US-strategy outlined by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice[21] were to translate into strong pressure on Iran, implying the threat of military action. For such a military option to be credible, it could be seen as mandatory to first deal with and neutralize Hizballah’s missile capabilities and its ability to inflict serious damage on Israel,[22] which most American and Israeli strategists view as a crucial strategic asset for Teheran, and as an important deterrent against any attack on Iran. Short of a new war, the only way to achieve this objective will be through the Lebanese government – leading to more pressure on Hizballah, and increasing the danger of violence even further.

“Politically, the international community must be careful not to break Lebanon in the process of trying to fix it. Political unity is the key to stability, and pushing the country too far will exacerbate internal divisions and ultimately prove counterproductive. Outside actors can encourage the government in Beirut to undertake overdue political reforms, but they must listen closely to its concerns in the process. At the same time, they must guard against efforts by any of Lebanon’s neighbors to undermine Resolution 1701. A despondent Israel, concerned about its army’s loss of prestige, should be dissuaded from launching any further attacks simply to reassert its military superiority. A cornered Syrian government, fearful of its loss of influence and the ongoing investigation into the Hariri assassination, should be coaxed along the road to peace. And with regard to Iran, Resolution 1701 would be best served by strong multilateral diplomacy to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions. A war with Iran would necessarily include Lebanon.”[23]

_{7 – PULLING BACK FROM THE ABYSS: RENEWING THE NATIONAL ACCORD}

The current scenario shows eerie similarities to the regional and domestic configuration at the eve of the Lebanese Civil war (1975-90): An armed sub-state actor confronting Israel against the will of the government, social and sectarian tensions enacted in conflicts over foreign policy, a state unable to impose its authority over parts of its territory, an army unwilling or incapable to intervene, significant parts of the population opposed to this situation and losing trust in the state and the security forces, the temptation for outside actors to use the country as an ersatz battlefield over regional supremacy. Yet, a fall into the abyss of renewed Civil War is by no means preordained. In 1958 protracted conflict between a pro-Western government (moving to join the Baghdad pact and isolate Lebanon from the conflicts of the region) and a nationalist opposition (following the call of Nasserism) charged with sectarian overtones (Maronite Christians vs. Sunni Muslims) led to clashes similar to the events of the past weeks. A compromise was eventually engineered between Egypt and the US, providing for a pro-Arab yet neutral foreign policy posture, and internal reform designed to strengthen the state and alleviate social conflict, which eventually ushered in the “golden era” of Lebanon’s legendary prosperity and cosmopolitanism in the 1960s. A similar solution may still be possible even under conditions of regional tension, if the international and regional players – mainly, the US, Israel, Iran and Syria – could agree to neutralize Lebanon rather than insisting to win it over into their own camp, even if that entails breaking it in the process. Likewise, Lebanese leaders from all sides need to take initiative, convince their foreign allies that continuing the current uncompromising stance will only lead to further instability or worse, and return to the essence of the “National Accord” in its various manifestations and reaffirmations since the establishment of the country: that decisions over issues of vital importance – such as war and peace, foreign policy alignments, the political and cultural identity of the country – can never be taken over the objections of a sizable minority.[24]

ENDNOTES

[1] The Lebanese political system is characterized by a complex system of checks and balances designed to guarantee specific shares of power to each of the country’s major sects. As a result, the country can typically only be governed through a broad consensus of all major political players, and governments tend to include diverging, often mutually opposed political forces.
[2] A number of reasons may be quoted for Aoun’s surprising turnabout: personal motives such as his aspirations to the presidency and his rivalry with Samir Geagea, the strongman of the pro-government Christian camp; political expediency – after being sidelined in 2005, Aoun is now again center stage -; but also programmatic affinities between the two movements - both are calling for a stronger, more efficient state, campaign against corruption and have strongly nationalist tendencies. On a deeper level, Aoun’s program amounts to an approach that seeks to secure the position of the Christian minority through the establishment of a non- or supra-confessional and strong state rather than confessional quota. In such a state, superior education and a broader economic base would secure the position of the Christian middle class without the need for special protection, while the Shiites could hope to prevail through the sheer force of (demographic) numbers. Finally, both groups are loath to see Lebanon dominated by Sunnis, and both are small majorities in an overwhelmingly Sunni region. However, despite such confluences of interest and ideology, there remains a deep cultural rift between the urbanized, secular and middle-class supporters of the FPM and the semi-rural, marginalized and deeply religious followers of Hizballah.
[3] Aoun’s FPM achieved more than two thirds of the Christian popular vote in the elections of 2005. Opponents claim that this support has deteriorated as a result of the alliance with Hizballah, but the large crowds which the FPM was able to mobilize for the December demonstrations cast doubt on such claims.
[4] Such as tightening control over the Lebanese-Syrian border, which may impede arms transfers to Hizballah; or ordering the army to aggressively search for weapons in the area south of the Litani. So far, the government and Hizballah have abided by a tacit understanding whereby only visible weapons are confiscated, with Hizballah keeping its armaments safely out of sight and government troops making no efforts to discover them. It is widely assumed that the poorly equipped Lebanese army would be no serious match for Hizballah’s combat-hardened units and may even disintegrate in the event of a serious conflict due to the large amount of Shiite Muslims in its ranks, and that the UNIFIL troops would be withdrawn quickly should such a conflict erupt (interview with former UNIFIL spokesman Timur Göksel, Beirut, November 2006).
[5] Hizballah politburo member Mahmoud Qumati in an interview with AP, quoted in Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “In Their Own Words: Hizballah’s Strategy in the Current Confrontation”, Carnegie Policy Outlook, January 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18962&prog=zgp&proj=zme.
[6] An obvious solution to this problem would be for the majority to appoint new Shiite ministers loyal to its political line. However, since Hizballah and Amal do in fact command the overwhelming majority of Shiite support, such a move would serve to alienate the Shiites even further, and could also be stalled by the president, who has to sign such appointments. Additionally, at least one fatwa (binding religious opinions) has been issued by a pro-Hizballah Sheikh in the recent past, prohibiting any Shiite to accept cabinet posts against the whishes of the two big Shiite parties. Shiite candidates for the vacant posts would thus quite literally be putting their lives on the line.
[7] International Crisis Group, "Lebanon at a Tripwire", Middle East Briefing 20, 21 December 2006; http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4586&l=1. Officially, the party agrees with the principle of a tribunal and raises objections only over certain principles and procedures that would govern its work.
[8] There is strong popular support for Hizballah in neighboring states such as Jordan and Egypt (not to mention Palestine), where there are no significant Shiite minorities and where hence the sectarian divide has no relevance for domestic politics. Official attempts to stem this potentially dangerous sentiment – given the pro-Western orientation of the two regimes – by accusing Arab Shiites of “being more loyal to Iran than to their own countries” (in the words of President Mubarak) have failed so far, and popular pressure forced both regimes to revise their initial anti-Hizballah stance during the 2006 war.
[9] Kheirallah Kheirallah in Al-Mustaqbal 01/11/07.
[10] Reporting on these incidents has been extremely biased and partisan, as practically all local and regional media have clearly taken sides in the conflict, making it difficult to obtain a balanced picture of who actually started the violence, with both sides blaming the other and the opposition accusing the government of consciously inciting such events in order to force it to abandon its strategy of mass mobilization and the downtown public protest.
[11] For example, two candidates nominated by the Hariris where elected in the southern province with the votes of Hizballah supporters, and at least one candidate of the Lebanese Forces in the mixed Baabda-Aley district prevailed over his Aounist competitor with the help of Hizballah.
[12] See David Ignatius: “Rice’s Strategic Reset”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/25/AR2007012501555.html.
[13] The Taif agreement of 1989, also known as “The Charter of National Reconciliation”, ultimately led to the end of the Civil War, amended the constitution, adjusted the sectarian quota system to comply with new demographic and political realities, and provided for a number of reform measures explicitly aimed at abolishing political confessionalism, most of which have been ignored or circumvented ever since.
[14] Paul Salem, “The Future of Lebanon”, Foreign Affairs 85 (6), 2006, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PaulSalemArticle.pdf.
[15] Ali Fayyad, “Hizballah and the Lebanese State. Reconciling a National Strategy with a Regional Role”, Arab Reform Brief 11, August 2006; http://www.arab-reform.net/article_ar.php3?lang=ar&id_article=276. An English version was previously available at http://www.arab-reform.net/article.php3?id_article=274 but was apparently removed.
[16] Michael Young in The Daily Star, 09/28/06.
[17] In 2005, Nasrallah rejected the idea of disarmament as “madness” and threatened that “any hand that tries to touch the arms of the resistance will be cut off.”
[18] The idea may sound far-fetched but is not without precedence: already on one of the major policy issues related to the regional conflict, the refusal to naturalize the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, a broad political consensus has been enshrined in the postwar constitution.
[19] Interview with Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, expert on Hizballah and Visiting Fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut, November 2006. See also Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “In Their Own Words: Hizballah’s Strategy in the Current Confrontation”, Carnegie Policy Outlook, January 2007, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18962&prog=zgp&proj=zme.
[20] Al-Akhbar, 01/11/07.
[21] David Ignatius, “Rice’s Strategic Reset”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/25/AR2007012501555.html.
[22] According to public statements by secretary general Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah has more than replenished its prewar arsenal. While it is not clear whether or not missiles are still or again deployed south of the river Litani, i.e. in the area of operations of UNIFIL, the larger missiles in the arsenal of Hizballah (such as the Fajr-5 missiles used during the last conflict) have enough range (up to 70 km, see http://www.meforum.org/article/806) to reach most of northern Israel even from the northern bank of the river, while the much smaller short-range Katjushas are easy to hide and transport in private cars and homes.
[23] Paul Salem, “The Future of Lebanon”, Foreign Affairs 85 (6), 2006, available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PaulSalemArticle.pdf.
[24] Practical solutions have been suggested or even drafted for most of the outstanding issues: a new government that would contain a sufficient number of opposition ministers to require compromise; a new, much improved election law has been drafted by an independent commission and could produce a more representative parliament; a politically neutral but generally respected figure could be elected for the presidency (army commander Michel Sleiman is often mentioned in this context); Hizballah’s armed units could be integrated into the army and its chain of command; and precisely circumscribed and transparent procedures and authorities for the international tribunal could alleviate the opposition’s concerns. Yet, none of these compromises is likely to be implemented in the current climate of confrontation and distrust, and in the absence of a package solution that also addresses the fundamental conflict.