Democracy in the Balance

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The Electoral Process

Even before the polls closed, Iraqi and international media and politicians declared a “victory for democracy” and “a victory for the Iraqis”. The high turnout (first said to be close to 80, later downgraded to somewhere above 60 percent) was widely praised, and countless reports were filed describing the long lines of Iraqis braving harsh weather and even harsher threats by militants vowing to “wash the streets with the blood of voters”. Pro-election Iraqi media such as Az-Zaman declared “A victory for all Iraqis”. The toll of “only” 37 dead on Election Day was hailed as proof that terrorism can be contained with sufficient force and determination.

While the determination and courage of those who went to vote indeed deserve praise, in particular in places such as Baghdad and Mosul, where the security situation had been especially precarious in the weeks before, much of the enthusiasm should be seen against the background of somber or indeed apocalyptic predictions preceding the ballot. While the successful elections might be a ray of light at the end of the tunnel, the way to the dawn of democracy is certainly still a long one. The unabated pace of deadly attacks over the following days clearly indicates that the security levels achieved during the polls (essentially by putting the country on hold for three consecutive days) are not (yet) sustainable over an extended period of time.

Fanning the Flames of Sectarianism and Separatism

Moreover, the ways voters were mobilized to achieve this high turnout, as well as the results available at this point in time, give credit to prior concerns that the election may “inflame rather than heal sectarian tensions” (MERIP Report Online, 28/01). “Many stepped into the trap of blind loyalty” conceded even the strongly pro-election Iraqi paper Ar-Rafidayn (02/02). While it might be true that many, in particular educated Iraqis are strongly opposed to sectarian politics, both the electoral system and the methods of voter mobilization applied by major political players seem to fan the flames of sectarianism rather than contribute to national unity. Lebanon, in this regard, may provide some edifying lessons: Certainly most educated Lebanese were and are appalled by religious meddling and sectarian politics both before and after the Civil War. Yet the divisive force of sectarianism proved powerful enough to sustain civil strife for a decade and half, and continues to mar and paralyze attempts of post-conflict reconciliation and nation-building, due to the determination of both domestic and foreign players to use it for their own ends. Many observers are voicing concern that the same ingredients are rife and ready in the Iraq of today.

“The violence, a closed public sphere, and power of ethnic and sectarian parties, are major impediments to Iraqis voting their “Iraqi” rather than a more narrowly defined conscience” concludes Mark LeVine of the University of California / Irvine (Middle East Online, 07/01/05).

According to all available signs and preliminary results, the Iraqi National Assembly will be dominated by the “United Iraqi Alliance” backed by a number of well-known Shiite clerics, the most prominent being Grand Ayatollah Ali As-Sistani, who declared participation in the vote a “religious duty”, and was displayed on the election posters of the list. While it is true that the list also includes a number of Sunni and Turkmen candidates and secular Shiites, the troubling fact (reported unanimously by foreign and Arab media on the ground) remains that mobilization occurred predominantly along sectarian lines and through the deployment of religious authority. As much as and probably more than constituting a vote for a democratic Iraq, the large turnout of Shiite voters thus also constitutes a show of force for the Shia majority (estimated at about 80% of the Arab and two thirds of the overall Iraqi population), whose position in Iraqi politics and society had long been at odds with its demographical weight. Voters interviewed in the Shiite areas of Iraq clearly and overwhelmingly seemed to be guided by considerations of religious, sectarian and sometimes tribal loyalties (Middle East Online, 31/01).

This is not meant to infer that the sectarian communities in themselves are monolithic. A sizeable amount of Shia voters, in particular the followers of the young cleric Moqtada As-Sadr, decided to join the boycott. Political representatives of the boycott front explicitly reject the sectarian equation, and prefer to describe the line of conflict as running between those who stayed in Iraq throughout all wars and repression, and those who came back to run the place after foreign armies cleared the way (Al Ahram Weekly, 20-26/01). Likewise, even in areas predominantly inhabited by Shiites, the decisively secular “Iraqi List” of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi was apparently able to harvest around one-fifth of the vote. However, it remains doubtful how effective this minority vote will be in the face of the overwhelming success of lists build around sectarian (Shia) and ethnic (Kurdish) alliances (together 215 out of 280 seats, followed by Allawi’s list with 40 according to the latest available figures.). More likely, these factors will become ever more dominant should the future political system be build along sectarian and ethnic lines, e.g. through a system of fixed proportional representation of communities.

In reverse, the same applies to predominantly Sunni areas, where the boycott announced by major Sunni parties was as successful as mobilization was in Shia areas. While in some areas such as Ramadi polls apparently never even opened, elsewhere security concerns and threats deterred the large majority of potential voters (As-Safir, Hayat, Middle East Online, Daily Star 31/01 u. 01/02).
“While Sunni Arabs feared for their lives if they voted, Shiites were concerned not to be ostracized if they didn’t” summarized Middle East Online the situation on the ground.

Similar to the predominantly Shia areas of the South, the Kurdish areas in the North were marked by a high a level of mobilization, likewise aimed at a show of demographic / political force. Long before the elections, an alliance between the two major Kurdish parties, who control different territories and waged war against each other in 1996, made clear that the objective of the elections would be to produce a political block designed to put Kurdish interest above any other political consideration. To make the message even clearer, a second set of ballots was set up outside the official polling stations, asking voters to also cast a vote for Kurdish independence. (Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, 02/02). The predictably high turnout already led to renewed Kurdish claims for the post of either president or prime minister, and triggered sharp reactions from neighboring Turkey, officially prompted by concern for the Turkoman minority in Norther Iraq, but obviously also driven by fears that “Iraqi Kurds See Chance to Press for Statehood”. (Iraq Net/The Times, 02/02)

Difficult Choices: Strategies & Alliances

- The Sunni Dilemma

Reluctance to give up privileges they enjoyed thru their association with the Baath-regime is often identified as the main reason why Iraqi Sunnis are loath to engage in the postwar process, or even prone to ally themselves with predominantly Sunnite militant groups, who allegedly include supporters of the Ancien Regime. However, a quick look clearly shows why the electoral system must have been “anathema for Sunni politicians” (Michael Young in The Daily Star, 09/12/04) and why a boycott would have looked like a better choice.

In the existing climate of obvious and unabashed sectarian and ethnic mobilization among the Shiite and Kurdish sectors of Iraqi society, the single-slate, single-constituency system adopted for these elections was bound to give the Sunni minority only a small share in the National Assembly even under the best of circumstances. With Iraqi Kurds already enjoying a de-facto autonomy in a more or less geographically continuous area, they would have been decisively outnumbered by a large block of Shiite representatives on most sticking points, and possibly even a Kurdish - Shiite alliance of convenience in some (for example the highly explosive resettlement issues in and around Kirkuk).
So far, so bad. However, with the given situation of a disastrous security situation precisely in the Sunni-inhabited provinces, the displacement of almost the whole population of the major city of Falouja, and a situation of siege in the major city of Ramadi, a low turnout and hence only a miniscule representation of Sunnis was all but certain. Conclusions such as “he who stood in line and voted will build the future, and he who stayed in his bed has foregone his rights”, as expressed by Abdelrahman Rashid of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat (02/02) miss the point, and the call, by the same author (joining a chorus of many), to the Sunni elite to “take their ideas to the Assembly, and find a majority for it” willfully ignores a situation where all political players use the tool of sectarian and ethnic mobilizationto make sure that majorities are not formed around issues, programs and ideas, but only around allegiance to a religious or ethnic community.

“The hard conventions of majority rule must be reconsidered and replaced with something guaranteeing effective minority representation. The election plan for Iraq fails utterly in this regard, and the insurgency will be fortified as a consequence.” (Michael Young, The Daily Star 09/12/04).

Hence a boycott must have looked like a rational choice for Sunni politicians who had reason to fear that elections will only give them a miniscule representation in the assembly, and that Sunnis elected on Shia-controlled lists would serve as a fig leaf to claim proper representation of all parts of Iraqi society (Christians in Lebanon have been stuck in exactly this equation over the past 15 years). A “successful” boycott on the other hand would create pressure on local and international political actors to negotiate a political deal with leading Sunni politicians outside the electoral procedures, since it is common sense that Sunnis have to be brought into the political process. The readiness to do bargaining has already emerged in the statements of the influential Council of Muslim Clerics, which announced its readiness to deal with the upcoming administration as a “caretaker government” representing “a part of the Iraqi people” and hence “neither legitimate nor completely illegitimate”.

Apart from the flaws in the electoral system, the effect of the heavy-handed military operations in Sunni population centers such as Falouja or Ramadi needs to be considered in an evaluation of the Sunni attitude towards the elections. Widespread, apparently indiscriminate destruction and a high death toll at the hands of coalition forces and their Iraqi auxiliaries have clearly contributed to a sense of being held collectively responsible for the acts of terror committed by militant groups operating out of these areas.

"They've equated Sunnis with terrorists. Under Saddam, one of out 1,000 Iraqis was a Salafi (Sunni fundamentalist). Now it's 100 out of 1,000, all because of the Americans", an unnamed Iraqi source was quoted by the staunchly conservative Washington Times. The fact that with Iyad Allwai a prominent, if secular Shiite with a history of close ties to the CIA is identified as the Iraqi face of repression, in particular through the siege of Falouja (while a similar stand-off in the Shia holy city of Najaf was successfully mediated and resolved by Ayatollah As-Sistani) contributes to the feeling of being vilified several times over, and  suspicions of an American-Shia alliance, an impression that the pre-election manifest of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi cynically but probably effectively exploited by coining the formula: “These elections are designed to hand Iraq over to the Shia”.

The estrangement of Sunni Arabs seems to reach such proportions that even declared pro-Americans such as Sheikh Majed Abdelrazzak Al-Sulaiman, a chief of the influential Dulaimi tribe in the troubled Anbar province and a personal friend of Allawi’s, were unable to come out in support of the elections, according to a report filed to The New Yorker by John Lee Anderson (24-31/01).

- The Shia Option

For quite a while now, media close to the current US-administration have worked to sell the Iraqi Shia community and clergy as a workable and trustworthy ally – a remarkable turn and a difficult task, given that major figures in the array of Shiite political forces in Iraq are known for their close ties to Iran, declared to be one of the most troublesome rogue states in George W. Bush’s latest “State of the Union” address. These attempts have largely focused on Ayatollah Ali As-Sistani (who is Iranian-born) even before the latter successfully reigned in the recalcitrant Moqtada Sadr. As early as in late 2003, Reuel Marc Gerecht of the leading neo-conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute (known for its proximity to the Pentagon) strongly advised:

“We are enormously lucky to have Sistani in post Saddam Iraq. If the old cleric were to die, our position among the Shiites might collapse overnight. Our objective with the grand ayatollah thus ought to be to cooperate (and preempt), not confront.” (The Weekly Standard, 22/12/03) As Gerecht himself concedes, the alliance with the Iraqi Shia would be a “Difficult Marriage”, but probably the only option left to achieve some sort of stability in Iraq, and thus the way “how Iraqi Shiites could save the presidency of George W. Bush”, as the subtitle of his article sums up the stakes.

As-Sistani has vindicated this remarkable amount of trust so far by containing the staunchly Anti-American cleric Moqtada Sadr, and quietly scrapping a former fatwa (religious opinion) declaring elections under occupation illegitimate. At the same time, he has thrown his full symbolic weight and religious authority behind the United Iraqi Alliance, with an apparent success in terms of Shia representation that leaves little doubt about the practical benefits of this “Difficult Marriage” from the Shia’s perspective. In some parts, doubts are raised about the cleric himself, who strongly advises against marriage between Sunnis and Shiites, and according to some observers even floated the idea of an independent confederation of Shia-dominated provinces (Fahmi Al-Huwaidi in Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat, 02/02). Calls for establishing a central role for Islam in coming constitution and the legal system may indicate that As-Sistani, so far considered a representative of the “quietist” current among the Shia clergy, might be more prone to take a political role then commonly expected.

While prominent Shia politicians and clergy have so far been cautious in avoiding open conflict with the coalition as well as with the Sunni part of the population, the sectarian mobilization put to work during the election campaign may trigger a dangerous dynamics that might well be hijacked by less scrupulous and cautious leaders such as Moqtada Sadr – for example if and when the militants successfully target exactly the moderate Shia leadership – and lead to civil and sectarian strife, “the nightmare Iraqi scenario that Shiites must not allow to become reality” (The Daily Star, 25/01).

Arab Positions

Predictably, there were Arab voices from the nationalist camp who blasted the elections as an American ploy and denounced it as “a democracy of marines”, part of a strategy of installing pro-American regimes in areas of strategic interest thru the pretended spread of democracy (Salaheddine Hafez, Al-Ahram 02/02), hailed the boycott front and called for “resistance as the only option” (Yassir Zaatira in the Ad-Dustour, 01/02).

However, a large variety of commentators of different backgrounds and persuasions point out that building the institutions of a functioning state will most likely be the fastest road to end the occupation, and to the creation of an Iraqi leadership that has the legitimacy and the power to make the foreign troops leave (Hassan Mneimeneh in Al-Hayat, 23/01). Often, the contrast between the electoral process and competition in Iraq and the “elections” in other Arab states is noted. “We cheer when the Great Leader is re-elected with no less than 100 %, and we sneer when the Iraqis have a true choice”, commented Samir Atallah of Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat. Even the publisher of the left-nationalist Lebanese daily As-Safir Talal Salman, typically strongly opposed to American politics on any account, concedes that “repression has made it acceptable for the people to vote in a ballot established by tanks”, and wonders (with little optimism, it seems) how long it would take other Arab regimes to learn the lessons involved (31/01).

Some authors also point out the difference between the supportive public positions towards the Palestinian elections three weeks earlier, likewise happening under occupation, “but while the occupation of the Americans in Iraq is ephemeral and constructive, the Israeli occupation is permanent and destructive, and while those who boycotted in Palestine represent a serious and credible resistance, the so-called resistance in Iraq lacks all these attributes.” (Wahied Abdelmagid, Al-Hayat 23/01)

It seems remarkable, in this context, that the election coverage of the Hizbollah-controlled TV Station Al-Manar, typically a source of sharp criticism against any American designs for the region, displayed obvious enthusiasm for the Iraqi polls. Clearly, the sectarian identity of the station and the party that controls it prevailed over the ideological stance opposed to American regional interests. In fact, many public positions vis-à-vis the Iraqi elections show a significant correlation to the sectarian identity or identifications of the personalities/institutions expressing it (e.g., the highly publicized concern of King Abdullah of Jordan about “a Shiite Crescent” in the making, including Iran, Iraq, Alawite - controlled Syria and Shia - dominated Lebanon). These observations support warnings, expressed for example by former Lebanese Prime Minister Salim El-Hoss, about potentially dangerous regional consequences should sectarian tensions in Iraq spin out of control.

The Way Ahead: Dialogue and Iraqi Empowerment

While the elections may have produced the nucleus of what may develop into a legitimate representation of the Iraqi people (at least more representative and more legitimate than the majority of regimes in the region, there included some of the most reliable Western allies such as Egypt or Tunisia) and create functioning institutions that could allow genuinely Iraqi ownership of the political process, the goal of rebuilding Iraqi society and achieving national reconciliation still seems in a distant future. To the extend that these elections may have led to the hardening of ethnic and sectarian rifts, the institutionalizing of community – defined identities and the marginalization of secular elements and civil society, the objective might be even more distant than before. Examples such as Bosnia or Lebanon seem to suggest that “democratic” regimes installed in the absence of a true national dialogue, and based on sectarian/ethnic representation, easily lead to protracted political stalemates and a political culture of zero-sum games stifling any development towards a shared national identity and common purpose. Moreover, if one or more communities end up with a perception of themselves as being marginalized or cornered, mines are laid at the foundations of the political edifice under construction.

“Iraq today faces the existential and fundamental issue of re-defining the very elements that constitute the nation, after being ravaged and deformed by years of dictatorship, wars and finally the occupation. No question that this will be difficult, but simply skipping over or evading this task is impossible, and will only lead to more of the terrible violence we are seeing today.” (Nahla Shahhal, Al-Hayat 23/01)

While the Kurdish minority will be represented in parliament with a sizeable block, has developed functioning institutions in the region it settles and can probably be integrated into the new Iraqi state thru provisions for regional autonomy as they are in place in many parts of the world (while resettlement issues still threaten to rekindle local conflicts), the most important challenge will be beyond any doubt bringing those forces back into the process who oppose the elections and the post-war “order” in place thus far, confirms the Iraqi intellectual Majed As-Samarra’i:
“While the elections are an important step forward for the Iraqis to assert their will after years of dictatorship and isolation, without finding a sustainable solution for the absence of the Arab-Nationalist, the Sunni and other political forces who boycotted the elections, without a national partnership in laying down the principles of the constitution, the effect of these elections will fade away, and they will not be an end to the crisis, but only its beginning. (…) the most important step now is to call for a conference of national reconciliation, an Iraqi Taif [referring to the conference at Taif/Saudi Arabia in 1989 that ended the Lebanese Civil War]” (Az-Zaman, 04/02)

As Leslie Gelb from the Council for Foreign Policy points out, the elected Iraqi National Assembly is entrusted to initiate, supervise and finally adopt a new Iraqi constitution, but not necessarily to write it itself – a difficult task anyway for a body of 275 members. Hence, it would be possible for the National Assembly to delegate this task to an appointed body that may include political currents who did not participate in the elections, and/or are not represented sufficiently in it (International Herald Tribune, 04/02). Spokesmen of the Council of Muslim Clerics have already publicly expressed their readiness to engage the government emerging from the elections, while the Sunni politician Adnan Pachachi reported “readiness” among parties of the Sunni boycott front to engage in the process of drafting the constitution. Such a procedure would also allow a stronger representation of civil society groups, women and other constituencies swiped away by the wave of sectarian/ethnic mobilization that marked these elections.

Extensive interviews carried out by the International Crisis Group in Iraq suggest that one of the most pressing tasks would be to invest the elected representation with as much real authority as possible.
“What Iraqis appear to want, and what so far has been lacking in spite of the transitional process is a genuine sense of ownership of the political process.” (Crisis Group Middle East Report #34: What Can the US Do in Iraq? - 22/12/2004). Hence, the ICG recommends a strategy of “dual disengagement”: “A gradual US political and military disengagement from Iraq and, no less important, a clear Iraqi political disengagement from the US. The new Iraqi state must define itself at least partially in opposition to US policies or it runs the risk of defining itself in opposition to many of its own citizens.”

Such a strategy may succeed in removing some of the most important objections of those who so far refused to participate in the political process, in particular if paired with a credible timetable for a withdrawal of coalition forces, one of the most prominent demands of Sunni and Shia rejectionists alike. In fact, the head of the Council of Muslim Clerics, Harith Al-Dhari publicly offered to endorse elections should such a timetable be presented (Al-Ahram Weekly, 20-26 January). Combined with a strategy of inclusion and a serious attempt by the winners of the elections of January 30 to build bridges to those who remain outside the process, it may also succeed to isolate militant groups and prevent them from claiming the legitimacy of a “national resistance”.

Beirut, 14/02/2005