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#INTRODUCTION [1]
The concept of civil society as it was interpreted and referred to in the experience of the Arab world draw an image of a concept that is not only widespread but also consensual. The reality could not be more different. This paper will show how the concept of civil society in the Arab intellectual discourses is indeed controversial and subject to different interpretations.
The aim of this paper is to show the historical roots of the concept of civil society in order to justify the variations of its adoption in the current Arab political discourses. The first section of the paper addresses the genesis of the concept of civil society with the changes that occurred in Europe with the event of the industrial revolution and the concept of social contract as a founding principle in the development of the civil society. This section shows how even in Europe, the concept of civil society was far from being consensual and that its interpretation varied according to the different liberal and Marxist schools of thought. What is important to retain from this section is that while the concept is interpreted differently it however remains a European construct affected by the material and political changes that occurred in Europe of the 19th century.
But how exactly was the concept of civil society adopted in the Arab intellectual discourse? The paper will show that just like the concept of civil society was controversial and divisive in the European political tradition, its internalisation within the Arab intellectual discourse was also diverse, at times contradictory. Three main perspectives developed the concept of civil society in the Arab world. The first liberal perspective defines civil society in relation to modernity, to the questioning of the nation state and religious institutions. The paper will argue how this liberal perspective is in direct tension with two other separate perspectives that believe in the adaptation of civil society to the traditional structures and religious institutions of Arab societies. This second section of the paper retraces the essential perspectives of civil society that are found in the modern Arab intellectual discourses.
The third section of the paper identifies the main actors and variables in any discussion about civil society in the Arab world. What are the implications of the different and conflicting perspectives on civil society on main actors like the state, traditional social structures, democracy, Islam, globalisation and international donor organisations? How do different interpretations of civil society affect their dynamics within Arab societies?
The assessment of the Arab intellectual discourse will be the centre of the fourth section of this paper that argues that modernity remains the main point of contention within the debate on civil society. Indeed, this section argues that as long as the question of modernity is not identified as a problematic variable in the civil society debate, civil society will continue to be subject to different interpretations and will continue to serve different political agendas. This section is equally interested in showing how the concept of "Arab Civil Society" is problematic in implying Arab nationalist project without adequately addressing the construction of its foundations.
How do all these questions translated empirically? In other words, do we translate this debate to a lived historical and political reality? The last section of the paper will take Iraq as a case study in analysing the effects of the different questions raised in this paper on its experience with civil society on one hand and its question for state construction and democratisation on the other.
#I. EUROPE IN MUTATION: “CIVIL SOCIETY” IN THE EUROPEAN TRADITION
1. THE GENESIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Europe in the Middle Age was based on a hierarchical social system under the principle of land rationing distinguishing clearly between land- owners and those who worked the lands. The ideological framework of the old system binds authority to sanctity and considers it, whether religious or political, absolute authority. The principle of “Divine Right” of the kings was the product of the “Old System”.
The social structures of the Old System were firstly shaken and then shattered by the events of the English, Dutch and then French revolutions that witnessed the downfall of the class of nobles. The clergy itself became questioned due to the growing inequalities within its ranks. By the 18th century, the ascending European capitalist bourgeoisies became essential to the functioning of the post-revolution societies that had started gradually identifying themselves independently from the clergy and the nobility (Al Alawi; Sourani).
The formation of the European bourgeoisie was accompanied by the widespread of the values and beliefs of this new class. Indeed, the Enlightenment, Rationalism, and scientific developments, were all the effects of an era where knowledge developed outside the authority of the church and the sacred realm. Civil society as it was first identified by Rousseau was constructed not in agreement with civil (civilian) but secularism.
2. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE CLASSICAL AGE
The development of the concept of civil society cannot be limited to a specific historical moment, a space or a single author. Instead, the concept is better understood as the accumulation of knowledge coupled by structural social changes taking place in Europe gradually and affecting the construction of the concept.
The theorisation of the bourgeois society was developed in Rousseau’s and Hobbes’ debate about man’s state of nature versus his state of culture. While Hobbes sees in man’s pre-societal state of nature the scene of “war of all against all”, Rousseau believes in the principles of goodness and justice embedded in the state of nature condemning the corruptive nature of society that consecrates private property. The disagreement of Hobbes and Rousseau regarding the state of nature/culture dichotomy does not prevent them from agreeing on the necessity of creating “social contract” between individuals.
Social contract was identified as a voluntary agreement between two parties to respect a series of principles. Social contract, as it was conceived, also protects the rights and defines the duties of each individual. Despite the debate around the concept of social contract, it is argued that the concept became the founding principle in the genesis of civil society.
John Locke’s contribution to the concept of social contract constitutes the foundations of the definition of civil society. Indeed, social contract, in Locke’s perspective, negates slavery and submission. The purpose of the social contract therefore lies in its protection of individuals and private property. Social contract leads to the elimination of the absolute rule that contradicts the spirit of civil society, itself based on the principle of free will. Social contract, in Locke’s definition, is tied to the safeguard of private property. Spinoza’s development of the concept of the “citizen” came as a confirmation to Locke’s conceptualisation of social contract and private property. Democracy was identified as a political ideal that can unite, in one instance, between freedom and the rule of law. Democracy is also the prototype that can transfer power to those that are declared fit by the people.
The close ties between private property, citizenship and democracy that were constructed by the philosophers of the 17th and 18th centuries, led to the establishment of the social contract as a binding principle in the new industrial European societies. It is in this logical context and strong political legitimacy that the concept of civil society derived it power in the classical age. (Al Alawi, 1991:58)
3. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE: BETWEEN MARXISM AND LIBERALISM
The liberal and Marxist ideologies were founded within the philosophical contributions of the Enlightenment that defined the concepts of private property, citizenship, and democracy, which constitute the cornerstone in the understanding of civil society. Due to their common philosophical influences, the two schools of thought met on two main points in understanding the effects of the industrial revolution. The first lies in both their understanding of the state and the second in the understanding of the industrial society.
For both the liberal and the Marxist traditions, the state comprises impersonal administrative apparatus built on strict hierarchical structures and regulations. Bureaucracy in that understanding is the closed restricted embodiment of that system. The army is an institution developing in parallel to and independently from civil society or the group of citizens. The establishment of the modern state also necessitated the separation between the legislative, the executive and the judicial authorities.
The “industrial society” for both ideologies is characterized by the clear division between the “familial” and the “professional” realms. Industrial society is equally known for its clear division of labour and the accumulation of capital. The management of the capital excess requires therefore the practice of rationalist behaviour on one hand and the creation of a class of labourers on the other. While both ideologies agree on a common definition of the state structure and modern capitalist societies, they nevertheless diverge immensely on the role attributed to each constitutive element of the modern state and society and the social and legal links that govern their dynamics. The concept of private property around which the capitalist industrial societies revolved, constitutes a point of contention between the liberal and the Marxist ideologies.
Liberal thought’s conception of private property sees in it an interest that should be protected. Private property is considered a civilising factor and source of security and prosperity. The protection of private property becomes a duty assigned to the state. The state in liberal thought derives its legitimacy from its duty of protecting the private interests and properties of its citizens. The liberal state is non-interventionist, works according to the principles of the social contract in order to protect the interests of the citizens or the constituents of “civil society”. Civil society in the liberal thought is the buffer zone between the family and the state.
The non-interventionist and safeguarding character of the capitalist liberal state was to be radically challenged by the Marxist ideology who perceives the state as merely the reflection of the dominant class’ ideology of control and hegemony. The state becomes the protector of the interest of the dominant class by the control over the means of production. The ideal state is the Marxist-Leninist proletarian state aimed at erasing class differences. Unlike the liberal guardian or non-interventionist state, the communist state intervenes, directs and plans in order to safeguard the interests of the proletariat.
The points of contention between the liberal and Marxist thought lies, as we have seen earlier, in the prescribed role of the state. With it comes the liberal definition of civil society as the buffer zone between the private realm (the family) and the public realm (the state) and in order to protect private interests from the potential hegemony of the state. The Marxist tradition sees in civil society the field for socio-economic conflict in which the ruling class exploits the working class under an ideology that constitutes the basis for the capitalist state (Al Alawi).
4. CIVIL SOCIETY AS HEGEMONY
The contribution of Gramsci (1937-1891) positions civil society not at the level of the infrastructure but at the superstructure level in parallel to “the political society” of political parties or state. Civil society that is located at the superstructure level of ideology has a “hegemonic” function. Whereas civil society practices indirect hegemony, political society (the state and its apparatus) practices a function of ‘direct control’ or ‘leadership’ expressed in the state role and the judicial sector. According to that interpretation, the current structure of civil society works towards achieving the interests of the ruling capitalist bourgeoisie through civil society’s elitist voluntary associations. What Gramsci advocates however is a civil society that incorporates the working class and its syndicates, workers associations and parties that constitute the foundation of the state that Gramsci idealised. Thus, Gramsci introduces culture or ideology as a new field of conflict and elevates civil society to the expression of capitalist alienation and oppression of the working class (Bishara, 1998: 200- 210).
The discussion of the theoretical development of the concept of civil society was intentionally placed before launching the discussion of the Arab interpretation of the concept in order to argue that the development of the concept of civil society took place in a particular historical phase in Europe and was coupled by developments on all the scientific, economic, political and philosophical levels. Therefore any understanding of the concept of civil society should emphasize the historical specificity of civil society.
What is also important to retain at this level, is that the genesis of the European concept of civil society raised several questions that bear methodological implications on the Arab conceptualisation of civil society. We saw in the previous discussion that liberal thought tied the rise of civil society with that of capitalism, economic liberalism, individualism and free will. The concept of civil society developed with the European bourgeoisie that benefited from the changes in the modes of production that came with the rise of capitalism and the European states. The European states were founded on basic opposition with the religious order where civil society became the free association of free people away from the hegemony of theocracy and the church.
Finally, the Marxist tradition defined civil society as an expression of working class oppression whether on a base or ideological level, where political parties are an intrinsic part of the role of the revolutionary civil society. Throughout this paper, we will see that the state, political parties, economic liberalism and religious associations, have deeply affected the Arab interpretations of the concept of civil society. The following section introduces civil society in the Arab intellectual discourse.
5. THE RETURN OF A CONCEPT
The concept of civil society, as it was seen in the previous sections, came in a historically specific European context. We saw how the deep social and political changes that occurred in Europe with the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution tied the concept of civil society to the social contract, the nation state, secularism, capitalism and economic liberalism. Civil society was then used as a conceptual tool by the Marxist tradition that placed civil society in the field of intra societal conflict. The Gramscian interpretation however elevates civil society to the ideological realm considering civil society the result of the hegemonic practice of the ruling elite. What characterises the concept of civil society is that it did not gather consensus in Europe. Indeed, the Marxist or liberal schools of thought adopted different interpretation of the concept. It worth noting that even within the European ideological debates, the concept of civil society was not consensual.
What explains the return in the use of the concept of civil society both in Europe and its reinterpretation in the Arab world? The following section will provide a brief account of the modern recuperation of the concept of civil society in the Arab world. It is argued, that while the birth of civil society was tied to a specific historical context in Europe, its return also reflects the economic and historical changes that occurred in the 21st century.
The classical liberal thought left little room for the public sphere outside the citizen-state- market equation where everything that is a public sphere and not a state is market and everything that is not a public sphere is a market. Civil society that had theoretically included social groupings under market economy and outside the state lost its founding characteristics with its complete realisation and fusion within liberal democracies which successes affect civil society’s interpretation and manifestation.
The Marxist project lies in the fusion of the state within society. With the achievement of that project especially in Russia and the Eastern Block, the disappearance of civil society coupled the necessary disappearance of the bourgeois state (Bishara, 1998:11). Civil society in Eastern Europe was forced to disappear. It was not until the end of the 1970s that the need arose to create a theoretical framework in order to understand the massive Polish civil society movement that challenged the communist state bringing together unionists, students and intellectuals [2]. Civil society became the alternative to the despotic state and a necessary condition to establish Democracy. This was the interpretation of civil society that was adopted in the Arab world. The following section attempts to explain the means of incorporation of civil society within Arab intellectual discourse.
The fifties and sixties witnessed the rise of post-colonial Arab states. Although colonialism had different effects on Arab societies, it had nevertheless contributed to shaping the Arab nationalist discourses (e.g.: Baath, Nasserism) that saw in the power of the nation state the solution to the remnants of the colonial rule. Radical Arab nationalist discourses did not adequately address the functioning of civil society since the discourses’ definitions of the ‘nation’ tied organically the individual, the society and the state, thus negating the principle of separation between civil society and the state. (Bishara, 1998:11).
The post-colonial Arab state in the Middle East and North Africa launched agrarian and political reforms through secular and modernizing policies. Arab nationalist intellectuals took part in the reforms and participated in the state construction where a unified nation state was still an ideal to be achieved. It was with the rising tension between the different Arab nationalist discourses (Nasserim and Baath) and within each discourse (Syrian and Iraqi Baath) that cracks began to show in the Arab nationalist ideological model.
Furthermore, the events of the 1967 war and the totalitarian tendencies of Arab regimes deepened the rift between the state and societies and accelerated the demands for democratisation and civil society. Instead of shifting from state-sponsored reforms towards entire institutional reforms, democratisation in the Arab world remained limited to the whims of the totalitarian regimes. The Islamist discourse prevailed in societies where the nationalist and socialist projects were checked by the failures of the Arab state-building projects and the conditionality imposed by the new world order. Arab intellectuals, whose field of interest was politics and political institutions, transferred the battle for democracy to civil society, which is seen by many Arab intellectuals as an act towards de-politicization.
Both economic liberalization that was coupled by the liberal conceptualisation of civil society and totalitarian tendencies within each Arab regime brought back the concept of civil society. The return of the concept directly implied the questioning of the role of the state. The following section explores the way the concept was incorporated in the Arab intellectual discourse.
#II. ARAB CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE INTELLECTUAL DISCOURSE
1. CIVIL SOCIETY IN LIBERAL THOUGHT
In the previous sections, we saw how the concept of civil society developed in a specific European context and was particularly shaped by the age of the enlightenment. Civil society became tightly linked to the social contract, to citizenship and democracy. With the events of the Industrial Revolution, the liberal school of thought however, considered the market as a new level between the public realm (the state) and the private realm (the family). It is argued that the mainstream Arab incorporation of the concept of civil society adopted the liberal definition of civil society.
The following section will show that although the liberal perspective was widely adopted in the Arab intellectual discourses, it nevertheless includes variations in interpretations. Indeed, even within the liberal thought, there were variations in allocating weight and importance to each of the founding elements of the liberal thought: the private realm, the public realm and the market. It is through the study of three main perspectives within the liberal school and the Arab intellectuals' stands towards traditional structures, political society and the market that this point will be made clear.
a. The modernizing and political perspective
The liberal ideology and its interpretation of civil society are enrooted as we have seen in modernity and the demise of the “old system”. It is indeed in that spirit that several authors understand civil society. Civil society according to that perspective is in tension with traditional and ascribed social structures (religion, ethnicity, tribe, etc.) and promotes voluntary, secular and achieved loyalties of the political process, including parties and professional unions.
The modernizing perspective like it was stated by M.K. Al Sayyid maintains that “civil society is absent in societies in which class divisions are of recent origins and are still largely overshadowed by ethnic and tribal loyalties” (Al Sayyid, 1995: 141). This perspective sees in the rise of civil society an opposition to traditional structures. One can also read suggestions to an evolutionary process from an old “traditional” to a new “class-based” society. In opposition to traditional structures, this perspective believes that civil society “is also grounded in a free economic market and the quest of the bourgeoisie for political differentiation from the state” (Norton, 1995: 8). This conception brings back to the civil society debates the debate on modernity and the positive evolution of societies.
Besides rejecting the traditional social structures in its definition of civil society, this perspective considers civil society “a melange of associations, clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties and groups that come together to provide a buffer between state and citizen” (Norton, 1995: 7). This perspective presents therefore a version of civil society where society is governed by achieved modern structures (associations, political parties, unions, etc.) in opposition to ascribed traditional structures (tribes, ethnicity, religious groups, etc.).
b. The modernizing and apolitical perspective
The modernizing and apolitical perspective is defended by authors who have incorporated the acquisitions of modernity in their definition of civil society in opposing it to traditional social structures. This perspective also separates civil society from the political process and mainly from the role of the state and political parties. In exploring the relationship between Arab civil society and the development process in the Arab world, Shahida El Baz maintains clearly this perspective in her position firstly regarding the state and secondly regarding traditional structures.
The relationship of the state with Arab civil society is portrayed in her definition of civil society which is “the mobilisation of people into powerful organisations, grass roots for service, productive or advocacy services” working towards “the enlargement of the development consciousness”. Mobilisation is required by civil society because “state mobilisation on a national level is generally shallow and does not lead to the level of changing popular cultural values that impede development” and because civil society “is more capable of translating local needs to goals and plans of action especially that it is closer and tighter to local groups and social movements.” (El Baz, 1998:5)
This definition of civil society in relation to the state raises serious implications. By declaring that state mobilization is “shallow”, the author therefore suggests that civil society is more capable if not more powerful than the state, and that mobilization should occur without coordination with the state. This puts the state outside, almost in opposition to, the development process.
In its modernizing character, this definition also states that “popular cultural values impede development”. This highly modernizing and positivist perspective, does not explain how do traditional structures (and their cultural values) stand in the way of development and more, why they should be changed, and according to what model?
c. The apolitical perspective
The previous sections discussed the different liberal perspectives that are modernizing in their understanding of traditional structures and their undermining of the role of the state in relation to civil society and the developmental process as a whole. A new kind of liberal framework in understanding civil society emerged in the discourse of international organizations and institutions and was consequently adopted by the numerous Arab civil society organizations working closely with international organizations. That discourse brings back the traditional social structures, minimizes the role of the state and political parties and inserts civil society in the globalisation of market and private sector power.
The United Nation Development Program (UNDP) believes that Civil Society Organizations (CSO) include:
“Community based organizations, women's rights organization, environmental groups, think tanks, religious congregations, grass roots and indigenous people's movements.”
This definition of civil society includes traditional social structures (“community based organizations”), religious groups and ethnicities (“indigenous people’s movements”) in its definition of civil society. This definition is in tension with the modernist conceptualization of civil society that sees in these traditional structures an “impediment to the developmental process” (El Baz, 1995:5).
This perspective seems to exclude however political parties and professional unions as vital actors in civil society. This exclusion however is not coincidental; it is indeed tied to a wider underestimation of the role of the state in the developmental process.
“The United Nations once dealt only with governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involving governments, international organizations, the business community, and civil society. In today’s world, we depend on each other.”
According to this perspective, the state becomes an actor like any other in the developmental process, where the private sector (i.e. the market) is an intrinsic contributor to civil society. Traditional groups are also encouraged to participate in civil society at the expense of professional unions and political parties.
2. CIVIL SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL STRUCTURES
The liberal ideology, which downplays the role of the state and perceives civil society as ‘modern’ or against the traditional social structures, was questioned by several Arab intellectuals. The following section proposes to discuss the standpoint of those authors who see in the current and ever existing traditional structures (tribes, clans, religious and ethnic groups) the expression of civil society.
The modernising liberal perspective was problematic on the methodological and conceptual levels in importing foreign concepts that are limited to specific geographical and temporal moments and trying to find roots for them in Arab societies. The identification of civil society with voluntary organizations, trade unions, professional associations and minority rights groups is restrictive since these groups and associations are few in the Arab world, or at least not representative of the existing social structures. If adopted, this modernist definition leads to the conclusion that civil society in the Arab world is almost non-existent.
It is precisely this argument that led many intellectuals to re-think civil society and contextualize it in its Arab social heritage. Indeed, some authors believe that focus should be placed on alternative traditional social groups (familial, tribal, religious, etc.) that fulfil the same function of civil society in the Arab world. This will highlight a wider array of organisations that constitute a link with the state, which would have been unaccepted otherwise (Schwedler, 1995:16).
The existence of an alternative to civil society, as it was understood by the modernist perspective has been advocated by Al Sayyid where
“Arab Societies not only knew the equivalent of civil formations but also survived through them. Individuals relied on these [traditional] formations for their identity and much of their basic needs. They insulated them from direct dealing with political authority.” (Al Sayyid, 1995:32)
This perspective therefore not only sees alternatives to the modernist perspective to civil society in our times, but also believes that civil society, in its inclusion of tribal, religious and ethnic institutions has always existed in Arab societies and is an intrinsic part of them.
This perspective was further developed by Burhan Ghalyoun (1991:740) in his critique of the imported modernist definition of civil society. Evolution, he argues, does not entail the replacement of a structure with another; instead it requires the discovery of new realities in already existing structures. For Ghalyoun, modernity should provide us with modern conceptual tools to include traditional structures in any understanding of civil society.
Ghalyoun further asserts that the rise of the first Arab Islamic state was inconceivable without the existence of traditional structures (tribes and their value system) that Islam used in order to build a new central state founded on ideological bases. The author believes that there is no contradiction between the nation state and traditional structure. He argues that the state does not need to cancel the traditional structures, but instead it needs to gather them under a new logic and that is the national state. The state is, “needs to gather the contradictions that are inherent in the traditional structures and rationalize them”. In that sense, the existing traditional structures that constitute civil society, contribute to the building of the modern nation state and that state itself regulates the traditional structures under a single banner of national unity (p. 740).
This perspective on civil society therefore, challenges the liberal and modernist interpretations of civil society in which traditional structures are considered old and backward, if not hampering the political process. Besides its critique of the modernist ideology, this perspective constructs an Arab civil society that is capable of including traditional tribal, ethnic and religious structures in the political process. After positioning traditional structures in relation to the state, what remains missing of this perspective however is a clear understanding of the relationship of these same traditional structure with the private sector and the market. Analysing the dynamics of traditional structures with the market remains a condition for measuring the success of a theory proposing an alternative to the modernist and liberal definition of civil society.
3. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION
The relationship of civil society with Islam in both ideology and institutions has been at the centre of the academic debates, especially with the spread of the liberal modernist discourse on civil society. The previous section presented an alternative to the modernist perspective by considering traditional structures and organizations as intrinsic constituents of civil society. The following section sheds light on the debate that not only challenges the modernist interpretation of civil society, but also introduces Islam as bearer of civil society values. On a second level, we will explore the discourse that goes as far as saying that Islam itself introduced the concept of civil society way before Europe of the Enlightenment.
Before exploring these two perspectives, it is of high importance to mention a prototype of the discourse that considers Islam and Islamic traditions directly opposed to civil society. This discourse places civil society in its European context of liberalism, capitalism and secularism promoting civil and secular rule. In this definition, civil society was also coupled with democracy or the concept of multiparty system. The essentialist view on Islam concludes that civil society is contradictory to Islam because Islam is inherently inconsistent with democracy. For authors like Bernard Lewis,
Islamic law knows no corporate legal persons; Islamic history shows no councils or communes, no synods or parliaments, no any other kind of elective or representative assembly. It is interesting that the jurists never accepted the principle of majority decision. There was no point, since the need for a procedure of corporate collective decision never arose. In heaven, there was one God, and one alone; on earth there was no court, but a single judge, not a state, but a single ruler (1994: 45-46)
In the same line, Elie Kedourie maintains that
“There is a deep confusion in the Arab public mind at least about the meaning of democracy. The confusion is, however, understandable since the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mind-set of Islam.” (1994:1)
This perspective that looks for the contemporary understanding of democracy and its modern democratic institutions in Islam provides a grim image about the relationship of Islam with democracy and hence, with civil society. What is important to retain at this level, is that this perspective that declares Islam and civil society mutually exclusive agrees -- without willing -- with the Islamic fundamentalist discourse that sees in any attempt to invoke social or political pluralism a challenge to uncontested rule of God, hence blasphemy .
It is precisely against these two perspectives that the following authors build their concept of civil society in relation to Islam. This understanding of civil society sees in Islam, the bearer of civil society values, if not the founder of civil society.
The relationship of Islam with democracy was conceived as a positive relation where
political freedom is the primary foundation that represents the principle of Shura in Islam, as those who hold power should always listen to the voice of the people. Political freedom ascertains that minorities can have a political will and that opposition can express itself. In other words, Islam is the first religion that confirmed the right of belief and worked on monitoring this freedom and protecting it (Subayhi, 2000: 44).
In addition to democracy, some authors chose to emphasize the social contract values inherent in the Islamic tradition. Indeed this perspective was developed by scholars like Subayhi (2000: 49) and Mussalli (1991:995) who believe that the Prophet’s social contract preceded that of Rousseau where the Sahifa which is the first political text that consolidates the rights and duties of Muslim and declares the People of the Book (Christians and Jews) to be under Islamic protectorate, can be considered the first Islamic constitution.
Furthermore, the first Islamic community that settled in Al Madina was referred to as Al-Mujatama’a al Madani (civil society) with ‘civil’ here indicating the establishment of the city that was composed of Muslim segments allied on tribal and geographic lines. Early Islamic society, as Mussalli argues, includes all sorts of groupings and heads of communities where the Mosque was a high cultural centre and the Awqaf independent institutions based on charity.
Both perspectives -- the essentialist and the Islamist -- are problematic in attempting to import foreign concepts and look for their existence in history. This methodology and its implications will be explored in detail in the later sections.
#III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY DEBATE
The first section of this paper understood the concept of civil society as intimately linked to Europe of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. It was argued that despite the fact that the Marxist and liberal understandings of civil society meet on their historical understanding of the rise of civil society, they nevertheless differ immensely in their interpretations of the role of each constitutive element of civil society.
The incorporation of the debate of civil society within the Arab intellectual discourse was not consensual either. Instead, it developed around three main discourses: the liberal, the traditionalist, and the Islamist. These discourses were built in response and often in opposition to each other. The Arab understanding of civil society brought to surface five essential points of contention around which the different perspectives were built.
The following section gathers all that have been said about the state, democracy, Islam, and traditional social structures in understanding Arab civil society. The following discussion defines the questions that have been raised and that ought to be answered in addressing civil society in the Arab world today.
1. THE STATE
The debate about civil society and the state shed light on the role of the state in the development process and on the relations between the state and civil society. The role of the state in the development process has been addressed by the liberal ideology that believes in the non-interventionist role of the state. The state in that perspective should only provide the legislative and administrative security for market dynamics to function. In the current liberal perspective, the social mobilizing role of the Arab state is considered shallow and incapable of competing with the strength of civil society that is ideally enrooted in the social structures (El Baz, 1998: 5). The contemporary liberal thought (as proposed by the United Nations and its Development Program), shrinks the role of the state and places it like any other actor (social, ethnic, gender, environmental, etc.) in the development process.
This perspective is substantiated by another perspective that sees in the state-civil society relation conflict, if not mutual exclusivity. This is due to the powerful and forceful nature of the Arab state that attempts to infiltrate civil society in order to acquire legitimacy. This has led to the destruction of civil society and the sustenance of totalitarian Arab regimes. The apparent strength of the Arab state reflects structural weakness because in a “backward context, the omnipresence of the state is less likely a real sign of strength” (Subayhi, 2000:111).
As we have seen, the first perspective considers the state a vital actor, like any other in relation to civil society while the second perspective sees in that relation conflict due to the strength of the state. The alternative approach seems to question the very notion that such a distinction exists and explores the power structures that are embedded the idea of autonomy of civil society from the state. While some authors consider the relationship of the state with civil society conflicting, others believe that “it is meaningless to speak of civil society in the absence of the state” (Norton, 1995:11-12). This perspective proposes a relationship of mutual acceptance between the state and civil society, where interface between government and civil society should be defined by cooperation rather than conflict.
2. DEMOCRACY
The role of civil society in Arab societies and its relation with Arab states, initiated the debate on democracy. The relationship of civil society with democracy was developed on several perspectives.
The first perspective believes that civil society is a necessary element for establishing democracy. The justification of that relationship is derived from the belief that civil society is an integral part of democratic institutions. Civil society, as Ibrahim argues, “Normatively implies values and behavioural codes of tolerating, if not accepting, the different ‘others’ and a tacit or explicit commitment to the peaceful management of differences among individuals and groups sharing the same public space – i.e. the polity” (Ibrahim, 1995: 28). According to that perspective, the normative components of democracy are similar to those of civil society.
Not only do democracy and civil society share similar grounds, but according to this perspective, civil society is also a precondition to the democratic process as it is founded in the modern-socio economic formations that “create their civil society organizations, which in turn strive for participatory governance” (31). Civil society according to that perspective is founded on the modern socio-economic structures that contribute to the creation and sustenance of democracy (El Baz, 1998:23).
While the previous perspective believes that civil society is a necessary condition for establishing democracy, another perspective defends democracy as a necessary condition for establishing civil society. Indeed, civil society begins to re-emerge when the government signals a willingness to allow room for some political reform and limited political contestation; this will eventually establish broad popular identification with the democratisation process and will therefore pave the way to democracy. Democracy itself, however, can be furthered with the development of civil society (Schwedler, 1995).
The relationship between civil society and democracy has been perceived as necessary, whether in the way civil society leads to democracy or democracy leads to civil society. The following perspective presents a different account on this relationship, one in which civil society is not sufficient to the democratic process.
According to Norton, the functioning of civil society is at the heart of democracy. Yet it remains, necessary but not sufficient. Norton argues that the state apparatus needs to ensure that members of civil society are behaving in a responsible manner and ensuring ‘civility’ where “unless the government plays a controlling or intermediary role, the result is likely to be chaos” (12-13). Within the same perspective, Schwedler argues that disparate voices from civil society should help shape state policy while the state serves as administrator and regulator to ensure fair play (20). The state therefore, should work on liberalising institutions and regulations to include civil society in the participative process. But the inclusion of civil society doesn’t necessarily lead to democracy as civil society can remain exclusive and not representative of class, gender and racial divides. Indeed, Hudson argues that “an opening by the state and regime that is confined only to a small upper middle class constituency may actually prove to be retrogressive by criteria of equity and redistribution” (Schwedler, 1995: 21).
3. ISLAM
Civil society as it developed in the European tradition was defined according to the secular values and the social contract of the Enlightenment, and in opposition to the clerical order of the time. The adaptation of civil society to the Arab world introduced Islam into the debate about its compatibility with civil society. The relationship of civil society with Islam was tied to the debate on democracy in the Arab world.
The first perspective rules out Islam from being part of civil society primarily because of its presumed anti-democratic character as “there is a deep confusion in the Arab public mind at least about the meaning of democracy” where “the confusion is, however, understandable since the idea of democracy is quite alien to the mindset of Islam” (Kedourie, 1994:1). It is important to restate at this point that this essentialist take on Islam categorically places it in tension with democracy, hence with civil society.
The second perspective disagrees with the essentialist view on Islam and considers Islamist organizations, in their variations and differences, compatible with civil society. This compatibility is however conditional. Indeed, For Norton and Kazemi, “participating in democratic political processes and peaceful coexistence with those holding different views are sufficient conditions to consider any organisation, Islamist or otherwise, a valuable part of civil society” (Schwedler, 1995: 15). This perspective assumes that Islam is not part of civil society a priori, but can become part of it, if it plays the rules of civil society in respecting participation and the democratic process. Islamic groups therefore must commit to the democratic values of civil society in order to be considered equal and adequate members.
The essentialist perception believes in the non-democratic nature of Islam while the relatively moderate perception sets conditions for the inclusion of Islam within civil society. In response to these two perspectives, several Islamist authors have constructed a vision of Islam that sees in Islam, not only the bearer of democratic values, but also the founder of civil society even before its development in the European tradition. This perspective has been developed in detail in the section about the relationship of civil society with democracy.
4. TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURES
The adoption of civil society in the Arab intellectual discourse has raised questions about the role of traditional structures (clans, tribes, religious organizations, ethnicities, etc.) in civil society formation. The debate on Arab civil society has developed on two main perspectives regarding traditional social structures.
The first perspective sees in traditional structures an obstacle to the establishment of civil society. This is due to the character of traditional structures and their presumed antagonism with the state. Traditional structures are considered backward, impeding social equality and standing in the way of state structures that treat all citizens equally. While traditional structures “precede the establishment of civil society, they are an obstacle to it” (Subayhi, 2000: 93). Civil society therefore “is not a society in its inherited traditional structures but one that rebels against its traditional structures”.
In discussing the role of traditional structures in the development of civil society, many authors sought to adopt a more inclusive perception of traditional structures where traditional structures, like religious groups can take part of civil society. The inclusion of traditional structures within civil society came, for many authors, as a reaction to the European origins and character of civil society. Attention was drawn therefore to Arab traditional groups that fulfil the same role of trade unions, parties and professional associations in Europe. Traditional structures are part of civil society as long as they constitute a link with the state, or an intermediary between the private and the public realm. The condition therefore lies in the representative character of traditional structures and their ability to intermediate with the state.
Others who wished to include traditional structures within civil society have set different conditions. The condition that is set is very similar to that of the Islamist organizations and that is participation and the acceptance of the democratic process. For Ibrahim, as long as traditional associations “accept the principle of pluralism and observe a modicum of civility in behaviour towards the ‘different other’, then they would be integral part of civil society” (1995:52). This perspective therefore considers traditional structures member of civil society in the sole condition of adopting civil society values of tolerance and participation.
The debate about the inclusion of traditional structures within civil society either restricts traditional structures from taking part in civil society or believes that civil society in the Arab world should be inclusive of traditional structures. These two perspectives according to Azmi Bishara (2000:13) are erroneous because they fix Arab society in one definition failing to see the interaction of its members and to understand the economic, social, and political roles of the traditional structures.
5. GLOBALIZATION
Throughout this paper we have seen how the concept of civil society originated in Europe of the Industrial Revolution. Civil society in concept and in reality was historically distinguished from the state with variations according to the different schools of thought that see in civil society a vital element in state construction and democratic institutions. What is of high importance to this paper is to note that European modernity consecrated the link between the concept of society and the liberal state as two frameworks for a single liberal equation.
This equation is problematic to authors like Sourani on the development of globalisation. Indeed, the consecration of the civil society/liberal state equation was one of the vital factors in the process of capital accumulation and capital expansion that took place in Europe. This has lead to the expansion of capital and the concept of liberal state not only in Europe, but in Europe's underdeveloped colonies. The roots of globalization, it is argued, are found in the capital accumulation and then expansion.
For authors like Sourani, the expansion of European capital in developing countries did not parallel the expansion of the concept of civil society and its democratic and participative implications. Instead, many developed countries remained bound by "traditional hierarchical structures" and governed "by corrupt state bureaucracies" Sourani, p 30). For authors like Sourani, the talk about civil society in developing countries is unthinkable particularly because developing societies have not gone through the material conditions that allowed for the development of civil society in Europe. Whether developing countries will ever go through that process remains highly questionable.
This perspective, although representative of several anti-globalization discourses in the Arab word, remains marginal. The reality is that while globalization in its liberal capitalist expansion character is challenged by several intellectuals, the means of challenging are embedded in civil society and the acquisitions of globalization. In other words, while the critique of globalization is similar, most civil society actors refer to liberal methods for getting the message through. This introduces the next section that questions the role of international agencies in local civil societies.
6. INTERNATIONAL DONOR AGENCIES
The role of international donor agencies, whether state-sponsored or independent, is considerable in the civil society debates. This section will look at the problematic of international agencies in our discussion of civil society. In this paper we would like to shed light on three crucial points in the dynamics of international donor agencies with local civil societies.
International donor agencies in developing countries have established through their local civil society partners relations which although they seem equal, they are in fact built on a clear relation of benefactor/beneficiary relation embedded in relations of power. Through this relation, international donor agencies' attempt to consecrate values based on 'partnership', 'transparency', 'participation' and most importantly, democracy in their relation with local civil societies. Authors like Sourani raise serious objections about the authenticity of these positions. While international organizations establish democratic relations with their local partners, they nevertheless accept the terms and conditions imposed on them by the central state of the country where they operate. In other words by collaborating with the state, international agencies seem to be giving legitimacy to state and its bureaucracies that have yet to acquire legitimacy and establish democracy (p. 31).
The other problematic inherent in the relation of international donor agencies with local civil societies lies in the growing financial force of international donors in countries where they operate. This parallels a growing political power in their home countries where they constitute immense lobbying groups on their respective governments. The implication of this fact on Arab civil society is that international agencies' lobbying power on their local governments usually leads governments to exercise diplomatic pressure against developing countries. An example of this is found in the kind of political pressure that Arab countries are subject to in cases of obvious breach of human rights.
This seems like a benign exercise of international power since the goals are to work towards establishing democratic values. In reality, this has serious and negative implications on the relationship of state and civil society or the state and its citizens. Indeed, by resorting to the means of international political pressure on their countries, citizens' struggle loose legitimacy as it encourages international intervention. The other serious implication is that the struggle becomes centred on specific cases without being able to address radical institutional reforms launched by political groups. This indirectly gives legitimacy to the ruling regime whose reason for existence remains intact.
The final question that should be raised in addressing the role of international donor agencies lies in the question of accountability of international donor organisations in developing countries. Indeed, the traditional functions of the state in the sphere of social services have either been privatised or delivered to international organizations, many of whom owe allegiance only to their home governments, if any. In that sense, international organisations are not accountable to anyone than their home countries taxpayers. The irony lies in the fact that whereas in ideal conditions civil society can demand accountability from the state, how can citizens of developing countries demand accountability from the international organizations?
#IV. ASSESSING CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE ARAB DISCOURSE
1. “ARAB CIVIL SOCIEY" OR ARAB NATIONALISM RECYCLED?
The previous section attempted to place the return of the use of the concept of civil society in its European and Arab contexts. It was argued that the return of the concept in the Arab world was accelerated by the failures of the Arab Nationalist ideologies and the inability of the Arab states to sustain democratic reforms. There were also links with the deep structural changes that occurred in East European socialist countries, which brought back the debate on democracy and civil society.
This sections aims at deconstructing the concept of “Arab Civil Society” before engaging in the discussion about its interpretation in the different Arab discourses. “Arab Civil Society” is a generic term that brings together different civil society experiences from Morocco to Oman. The question to be asked at this point, what is so common in the Arab countries' experiences of civil society?
While the concept of Arab Civil Society is widely used, very few are the authors who find it necessary to justify its existence and socio-political implications. In the discussion of the commonalities of different Arab experiences with civil society, some authors chose to place the Arab world within its third world context. What brings together Arab countries together is initially the experience of underdevelopment and its “distorted social structures”, the “uneasy coexistence of the traditional and modern productive sectors”, the colonial impact transformed into economic liberalism consecrating western domination. What also brings together the developing world, Abou Halawa argues is the striking difference of access to power and economic resources (1998: 99 -102).
Arab countries share therefore the experience of underdevelopment and dependent political structures. But what else do they have in common in their experience of civil society? The common points that join the experiences of Arab countries with civil society are on two conjunctural and structural levels.
On the conjunctural level, authors like El Baz argue that growth of the NGO sector in the Arab world is linked to its consolidation in rapidly growing urban areas at the expense of the rural areas, therefore consolidating the status quo of rural alienation from the development process. El Baz states that half of the development organizations in the Arab world are still charity-based and are not based on productive and developmental goals (1998: 13).
What also bring together civil societies in the Arab world are structural problems that characterise their functioning. Indeed, despite electoral processes that most Arab NGOs go through, El Baz argue that they remain non-democratic and generally male dominated. Arab NGOs are also thought to be non-independent with equivocal relations with the state on one hand, and donor agencies on the other. Arab NGOs are seen as the tools in the hand of market economy in accelerating economic liberalization and institutionalising locally international financial policies. Finally, Arab NGOs’ relationship with their stakeholders is perceived to be weak and unequal.
The previous reconstruction of Arab civil society is based on a series of assumptions that bear political implications. The first assumption is in equating civil society with non-governmental organizations. While non-governmental organizations are an intrinsic part of civil society, they are not exclusive to its formation. Indeed, in bringing out the commonalities of experiences of Arab countries with civil society, authors fail to include political parties and unions as equal stakeholders in civil society. The challenge therefore is to construct the concept of Arab civil society by bringing together the different Arab experiences with party politics or professional unions.
The concept of civil society, as we have seen earlier, assumes the existence of a state with which civil society engages (where levels of engagement vary between different schools of thought). The second assumption is that is that the concept of Arab civil society directly entails the existence of an “Arab Sate”. Despite the fact that “the birth of new Arab states were midwifed by Western colonial powers” (Ibrahim, 1995: 33), the experiences of Arab states with colonialism were anything but similar. Indeed, French colonialism of Algeria, British Mandate of Palestine, and British protectorate over the Gulf has little common grounds. Besides a different colonial construct, Arab states were built on different social and political structures whether they are monarchies, popular democracies, republics, with varying political legitimacy and unsettled national borders. What is important to mention at this point is that the assumption of the existence of “Arab states” is not restricted to the debates on civil society but has been prevalent in studies in the politics of the Arab world.
The third assumption of the concept of Arab civil society is in the existence of an “Arab Society” in which “Arab Civil Society” is embedded. Despite cultural, historical and linguistic commonalities, Arab societies’ unity under the generic term of “Arab society” is still to be questioned. In their tribal, sectarian or ethnic characteristics, Arab societies differ immensely. More differences are yet to be unearthed with the weakening of the Arab nationalist ideology, the bourgeoning of sectarian (ethnic, religious, regional) loyalties and the redesigning of Arab states under the new world order.
The three assumptions discussed above, raise serious methodological implications in the study of Arab civil society and hence, theoretical consequences. The methodological problem is in using the concept of “Arab Civil Society” as a given and then insert it into the different schools of thought (liberal or Marxist) without having to consolidate it conceptually. Is there really an “Arab state”? Is there really an “Arab Society?” The answers to these questions will determine whether “Arab Society” really exists. This point neither questions the Arab nationalist project, nor suggests alternatives to it. What it merely does, is warn of the ideological implications of using non substantiated concepts that are so entrenched in the modern Arab intellectual history and are rarely questioned. Has the loss of faith in the Arab national discourse perhaps resulted in building up the concept of "civil society" with the same nationalist spirit under a different framework?
2. THE PROBLEMATIC OF MODERNITY IN THE CIVIL SOCIETY DEBATE
The previous section retraced the implication of the concept of civil society on the state, traditional structures, democracy and Islam. An assessment of the incorporation of the concept of civil society must raise attention to several interconnected point. The first is that debate over modernity is intrinsic to the debate on civil and at the same time divisive. While the question on whether civil society is entrenched in traditional structures or whether traditional structures 'qualify' to be part of civil society is a highly divisive issue in the contemporary intellectual discourse. Parallel to that issue, if not directly related to it is the problematic that Islam raises in the interpretation of civil society in the Arab world. While some belief in the mutual exclusivity of Islam and democracy and civil society, others maintain that Islam and its institutions are in complete coherence with, if not founders of the concept of civil society.
The inclusion of Islamic institutions and/or traditional structures to the concept of civil society appears at first to be a taxonomical dilemma, or solely a conceptual classification problem. The reason why this dilemma raises serious debate is due to its implications to the modern Arab societies. Indeed, if Islamic and/or traditional institutions were declared legitimate members of civil society, then this necessitates a re-distribution of resources that is at play within civil society. Furthermore, if traditional and Islamic institutions were allowed to play according to the civil society 'rules' then this will raise serious questions on the viability of some Arab regimes. Examples of the recent future, like the genesis of the Algerian civil war in 1992, shows that the legitimisation of the powerful actors that are traditional structures will ultimately shake the power structure of the Arab regimes, themselves based either on modernist secularist structure or on a rent system that only encourage apolitical traditional participation.
The question of 'settling' a debate in the social sciences is not only unthinkable, but it is also antithetical to the very existence of social sciences where concepts are reworked and reinterpreted with changes occurring in the material world. What if of high importance to the Arab intellectual discourse, is to be aware of the implication of the introduction of modernity in the debate over the concept of civil society, which to this day does not aim at deepening the understanding of changes occurring in the Arab world or the role of the civil and political structures. It is instead an attempt to rebuild the modernist ideology of the defeated elite on bases that coincide with the spirit of the phase we are living in. In this phase, the Arab state lacks of any social and political project with the exception of the position of the Arab state against anti-state ideologies that take in Islam the source of its political ideology but that can use, in different historical contexts, other platforms to propagate its ideologies.
#V. THE CHALLENGES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN IRAQ
The debate about Arab civil society as we have seen earlier raised fundamental questions about the relationship of civil society with the state, democracy, religion and traditional social structures. We have seen how each of these components was defended by authors belonging to different ideological currents ranging from modernism and political Islam. The previous sections also placed “Arab civil society” both in its conceptual and globalisation contexts.
The following section sheds light on Iraq and its civil society. The choice to emphasize Iraq emanates from the need to map the main challenges of a country that is undergoing radical changes. Besides the immediate urgency to understand the structural changes taking place in Iraq today, Iraq is also important to our study since civil society poses particular set of questions regarding the establishment of civil society in the current order. But Iraqi civil society is also representative of the main challenges that all Arab countries will have to face in relation to the state, democracy, religion and traditional social structures.
While the literature about the Iraqi civil society is scarce, attention has been placed on the rise of the Baath regime and its confiscation of power. There was a consensus however that civil society, as a democratic mediator between the individual and the state in Iraq was antithetic to the Iraqi totalitarian state. Associations, interest groups, journals, political parties that had existed and been active before the coup of 1963 were systematically harassed and banned from participating in the Iraqi political process. This section does not aim at detailing the different stages that the Iraqi civil society underwent since the establishment of the Baath state. What it aims at however, is to state the current challenges that the Iraqi civil will have to face in the current context.
The fall of the Saddam regime also entailed the demise of the Baath state where pressing questions relating to the establishment of civil society and the increase of participation are being raised. What kind of state is being planned for Iraq? The answer to that question can be found in the neo-liberal economic policies that are being put forward by the American administration that aims at downsizing the role of the Iraqi state through fiscal adjustment, privatisation, decontrolling the financial sector, liberalizing trade, creating incentives to foreign investments, reforming social security, and reforming labour market (Looney, 2003). The mere implementation of the neo-liberal – with no judgement of its success chances – raises serious questions about the relationship of the downsized state with civil society. What will become of the state in the developmental and reconstruction process? Will privatisation render development and reconstruction the sole responsibilities of the private sector? Will civil society be allowed to participate in the reconstruction process alongside the private sector?
The design of the future Iraqi state raises questions relating to civil society and democracy. Is the establishment of democracy an incentive or a necessary condition to the development of the Iraqi civil society? In the absence of legitimacy in the democratisation process, does democracy and the restoration of legitimacy to the democratisation process become the sole responsibility of the Iraqi civil society? In other words, does the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state lead to the establishment of civil society or should Iraqi civil society contribute to the establishment of a democratic state? What can we say about the dynamics of cooperation between civil society and the state?
In assessing the relationship of democracy with civil society, the question about the dynamics of civil society with political Islam becomes pressing. Indeed, what we gathered from the previous debates is that Islam and civil society are mutually exclusive or at least at conflict. In that perspective is there room for Islamist organizations within the rising Iraqi civil society? If we adopt the perspective that includes Islamist groups within civil society as long as they accept the civil society rules of tolerance, can we speak of an Iraqi civil society that includes Islamist organizations in the absence of any functional democratic process? What are the implications of the democratic participation in a system that can bring to power religious groups that are intolerant or that preach non-democratic values?
Any discussion about the potential role of the Iraqi civil society should assess first the contribution of social groups and traditional social structures that had been previously excluded from the political process. It is argued that the relationship of the Baath state with traditional social structures, especially clans and tribes, has been quite ambiguous. Besides rejecting the liberal conception of civil society in the name of Arab nationalism, the Baath party adopted a modernist view of traditional social structures that could have constituted the alternative to civil society. The Baath ideologically systematically expressed unequivocal rejection of tribalism associated with sectarianism where it was declared ‘remnants of colonialism’ (Baram, 1997:1). In addition, sheikhs and tribal leaders have been regarded as the epitome of reactionary and backwardness. Tribes and clans were equated to feudalism and seen as a direct threat to Baath. They were later perceived as opposed to pan-Arabism and Iraqi patriotism. The Baath regime sought at weakening the tribal system through a process of nationalisation of lands and speeding the urbanisation process which led to the growth of the urban non -tribal population.
Tribal structures did not disappear however, they somehow infiltrated the Baath regime especially after the events of the Gulf-War and the aborted popular uprising of 1991. Al Khafaji argues that only then did Saddam Hussein “make a reluctant admission that intermediate social layers between the state and individuals were required to extend control mechanisms and channel people’s frustrations and demands” (80). This interpretation argues that there was a need for the Iraqi state to encourage the formation of intermediary tribes that will negotiate the relationship of the state with its citizens. This happened when the regime of Saddam was in dire need for legitimacy and where there was necessary to channel social tension. In the context of absence of legitimacy to the Iraqi state under construction, and of the growing tension between different tribes, the question is whether there will be a need to include traditional structures within Iraqi civil society. Will tribes that had been ideologically excluded from state construction been asked to join in the reconstruction of Iraq? Will the state democratisation process suffer from the inclusion of tribes or will tribes have to conform to the rules of civil society of tolerance and power sharing?
Is there room for civil society in the absence of state institutions outside international patronage and the scarcity of legitimacy? What is the role of Iraqi civil society in the absence of just and representative democratic institutions? Can we talk about a unified Iraqi civil society including traditional structures, sectarian and ethnic loyalties that are redefining social loyalties? The aim of this section was to highlight the essential points that have been raised in this paper in order to address the pressing question that Iraq is facing today. Addressing properly these questions will contribute towards a sound understanding of the challenges of reconstruction and occupation that are facing the Iraqi civil society.
#CONCLUSIONS
Throughout this paper we have tried to show the divisive and non-consensual characteristics of civil society. Civil society was retraced back to its European origins to show how it was affected by the material changes that occurred in Europe of the 19th century. This paper also showed how the interpretation of civil society in the Arab world was not only affected by variations in different schools of thought but also how these interpretations have serious implications on necessary actors in the civil society construction in the developing world of the 21st century. Indeed the modern Arab interpretation of civil society bears serious effects on the perception of the role of the state, the democratisation process, and on the position towards traditional structures and Islam. These interpretations are also affected by the economic and political outcomes of globalisation and the increasing power of international donor agencies.
The main problem in the debate about civil society in the Arab world remains in the improper handling of the problems of modernity. Indeed, modernity is directly defined as mutually exclusive to traditional social structures and religion. Modernity is also seen as a necessary stage in the development of all societies. Until the question of modernity is resolved, it is more likely that the concept of civil society will not only continue to be divisive but is a source of violent tension especially in the presence of the political agendas of the international forces.
All these questions, as we have seen are crucial to understand the challenges that the Iraqi civil society is currently facing. Who will take place in the Iraqi state reconstruction process? Are religious institutions and/or religious structures included in the current definition of the Iraqi civil society? Can the Iraqi civil society contribute to state reconstruction process without deriving its legitimacy from all sectors of Iraqi society? Finally, can we speak of Iraqi democratization process in the current military and colonial contexts? The challenges that the Iraqi civil society is facing are arguably an illustration of the kinds of challenges that all Arab civil societies increasingly have to face.
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ENDNOTES
[1] This study was commissioned to stir a debate at the seminar “Civil Society from the Arab Perspective: Experiences and Challenges in Iraq and the Region,” 15-17 October 2004 in Beirut, jointly organized by the Heinrich Boell Foundation’s Middle East Office and the Arab NGO Network for Development.
[2] On the evolution of the concept within the East European experience, see Andrew Arato: “Civil Society against the state: Poland 1980-1981”, Telos, no.47 (Spring 1981)., 23-47, and “Empire vs. Civil Society: Poland 1979-1982”, Telos, n.50 (Winter 1981-1982) -19-48; John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the state (London: Verso, 1988), and John A. Hall, “In search of Civil Society” in John A. Hall, ed., Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison (Cambridge: 1995), pp1- 32. | 
