

MODERNITY AND ANTI-MODERNITY FACING CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION

- Plea for a modern, yet historically aware discourse

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Abstract:

Intercultural dialogue should be based on realistic situations. It takes place in a context, which bears many similarities with structural characteristics of the world economy. This paper examines these structural analogies and pleads for the use of historical and comparative experiences and particularly a realistic portrayal of cultural conflict in European history.

Since the mid-nineties, the term “globalization” increasingly became an integral component of a worldwide political and academic discourse. Given similar experiences of specific terms becoming part of public discourse, it is known that such a process always reflects real facts. Nevertheless, an idea that has been integrated into public discourse presents a problem when, as often as is the case in highly developed countries, worldwide parallelisms are assumed, which leads to a distorted, possibly even false, image of the world. For this world still distinguishes itself through highly differentiated substructures, i.e. sub-worlds, which are based on hierarchical layers that do not simply exist beside each other, but clearly relate to one another.¹

Such a statement applies not only to the political world economy – regarding the existence of *symmetrical interrelated centers* and *asymmetrical interdependent centers*, sub-centers, semi-peripheries, peripheries and sub-peripheries – but also refers to politically relevant context-specific cultural profiles. It is precisely this latter point – embedding cultural profiles in specific social formations, which are currently mainly economically determined – that must be carefully considered if a productive intercultural dialogue is to be achieved.

1. Culturally Relevant Contexts of the World Economy

Among the developed industrial societies, (the OECD world), processes reducing the importance of borders can be observed; this leads to the creation of complex interdependencies of a variety of dimensions (politics, economy, society, culture). This process is widely developed in the economic sector. The accelerated development of the European market is a good example, which is now characterized by a high mobility of decisive economic factors driven by free-trade. Interdependencies at this level are characterized by symmetry and a substitutive division of labor. All involved economies aspire toward capital-oriented, knowledge-oriented and technology-oriented production – they are equally competitive and export the same kind of high value-added products across existing national borders. This parity creates simultaneously increased competition and integrated markets, which surpasses existing borders. As competition takes place at the same level of competencies, this leads to what one may call “*globalization de luxe*,” a symmetrical penetration of markets with comparable and replaceable products. Such a division of labor represents a win-win situation for everybody concerned, including the consumers.²

However outside of the OECD economies, this is rarely the case. At the global level, we instead encounter a gaping divide in the level of competencies between the highly productive and less productive economies. Less productive economies are exposed to dramatic displacement competition pushing them out of the markets; they are under marginalizing pressure, in danger of being marginalized and forced into the peripheries of the world economy.³

Naturally, this difference in production and competencies, and the resulting asymmetrical competition, is not developed equally everywhere. And obviously, a less productive economy (*économie dominée*) will display a variety of different reactions when compared to a productive *économie dominante*: Decline and dilapidation, also regression, is a possibility often observed, (as is the case today in sub-Saharan Africa). Another possible and empirically observable reaction, (witnessed in Latin America until recently), is a partial sealing-off of markets accompanied by attempts at auto-centered development (industrialization through import substitution). A third, and rather unusual, type of reaction can be described as an innovative response to the above described challenge: all forces

are mobilized to resist displacement competition and to successfully counter it. The highly productive economy is then confronted with a displacement competition of a different kind: competitors are faced with at first basic, and then more and more complex products produced at an extremely low labor cost. This leads to a “*dependency reversal*,” i.e. a reversed displacement competition waged by latecomers to the development process against the old industrial countries (e.g. Eastern Asia in the past decades).

However, and in contrast to this exceptional case, in less productive societies and economies globalization usually leads to “*structural heterogeneity*” – a term correctly coined by developmental researchers decades ago. This term depicts a social and economic structure where different levels and methods of production coexist in a hierarchical and layered balance. On the one hand, highly productive subsidiary companies of multinational groups coexist with a meager self-subsistent economy. On the other hand, sandwiched between those two sectors are a fragile local industry and a bloated service sector struggling for survival. A common consequence of such a structure - which encompasses a difference in capital and technological equipment, managerial abilities, competencies, power and income - is the accentuation of the gap between rich and poor, between the privileged and marginalized, *within the same society*. In such a configuration, economic growth will lead to an increase, rather than to a decrease, of structural heterogeneity. Homogenization of the economy, considered necessary to achieve successful development, does not take place. The consequences can be found in the social disasters ravaging developing countries, which are repeatedly in the limelight of third world policy discussions.⁴

A few decades ago, the passionate debate revolving around development in Latin America focused on “simultaneous transnational capitalistic integration and national disintegration” – an essential aspect of the so-called *dependencia* discussion. In the meantime, the situation has come to a head in those countries, as differences in competencies and productivity, and the threat of peripheralization and marginalization, further increased. In the past, authors (such as A. Cordova, F.H. Cardoso, R.M. Marini, A. Quijano and O. Sunkel) contemplated the Latin American case; others (such as Samir Amin) dealt with Africa and the rest of the world. Other authors made relevant observations regarding the starting point of a “world system analysis“ (I. Wallerstein).⁵

Thus, the globalization problem (“transnational capitalistic integration”), which currently affects a large part of the world, is not an unfamiliar appearance, nor is its merciless consequence: national disintegration” as the result of an asymmetric displacement competition, reaching from the centers of the world economy to the sub-peripheries. *For developing societies, globalization existed long before it was circulated as a term.* As such, it seems useful to re-examine the facts of *globalization avant la lettre* in order to avoid the default *globalization de luxe* which, as experienced in the OECD context, is presumed representative for the rest of the world.⁶

2. Structural Analogy of Cultural Profiles

From an economic perspective, a remarkable structural analogy regarding *cultural globalization* becomes apparent. Here, again, a multi-layered picture is needed. National borders are losing their paramount importance, but the consequences differ drastically depending on whether the context is the OECD world or the rest of the globe.

Within the OECD world, cultural exchange is considered as *qualitative enrichment*, regardless of whether its roots lie in other comparable developed societies or in the rest of the world. Cultural exchange strengthens the diversity of cultural impulses, be it in the arts, film, music (“world music”) or literature. This diversity increases the already vast cultural offerings on display, thus accentuating the cosmopolitan, post-modern flair of these societies. A mixture of styles takes place, either in the form of hybridization, *cross-overs* or similar fusions.⁷ In this wide-ranging popular culture, such occurrences are interesting and culturally exciting, but usually of little political relevance. Obviously, the concerned societies are capable of absorbing these numerous impulses without risking identity crisis. Most importantly, a pluralistic and increasingly colorful cultural scene has not, or at least not yet, been known to threaten the essence of political culture, i.e. the acceptance of plurality and the ability to deal constructively with it through the help of institutionalized measures. Apart from the integration of migrants, which poses only a territorially limited problem, this can be considered as *cultural globalization de luxe*.

In developing societies worldwide, the situation is typically very different. External cultural influence, which stems from the superior economics, technology and media of the OECD

world, is often experienced as a direct attack on one's own (typically already frail) identity. This alien culture, imposing itself from the centers, is then perceived as part and parcel of an aggressive, *asymmetrically* structured *cultural* displacement competition. As described in the field of economics, there exist three fundamental patterns of reaction: regression as a consequence of overburdening, resistance as an expression of opposition (such phenomena can also be found in highly developed societies, e.g. France's reaction to the overwhelming American cultural influence) and, occasionally, innovation, the creation of something new in response to an overwhelming challenge.

More likely however, and similar to the economic analysis, displacement competition leads to the creation of structural heterogeneity, in this case from a cultural perspective.⁸ As a consequence of cultural globalization, societies fragment into sections comprising different mental and cultural orientations. There are the "Westerners," who not only are at ease with Western culture (plurality of interests and identities, individualism, gender equality, self-determination etc.), but wish their own societies to rapidly develop similar cultural patterns, which they consider a precondition to achieve the civic development deemed necessary to overcome structural dependency. Then there are those who strive to integrate both - synthesizing modernity and traditional cultural patterns - seeking to conserve their own culture, but unwilling to forgo the blessings of technology. Nicknamed the "Half Modernists," they aspire to modernize only science and technology, intentionally leaving their culture intact. Others, such as the "Traditionalists," tend to only observe in the past what they wish to project into it; they become representatives of a process also known as the "invention of tradition." Finally, there exists the fundamentalist reaction, at the local and at the international level, which responds aggressively to the challenges produced by Western culture ("the devil," "Satan"), even reacting in some cases with local or international terrorism. However, the cultural content of the latter reaction is minimal, or even nonexistent. Terrorist violence aims at spreading fear, whilst mobilizing support among sympathizers. Most importantly, terror is used as an instrument to gain power. Culture, and more specifically, religion, is usually functionalized in an obviously opportunistic manner, leading to anti-culture, and in extreme cases to macro-criminality hiding under a cultural or religious cloak.⁹

It should be stressed that the concrete cultural/political reaction emerging in a given case largely depends on the success or failure of socio-economic and political transformation

processes. If these transformation processes are relatively successful and lead to an “*upgrading*” in the long-term, as was the case in East Asia, then processes of cultural change may be painful, but will generally be characterized by a willingness to adapt and learn.¹⁰ In societies that find themselves plunged into a deep and chronic development crisis, i.e. a crisis without an end in sight, cultural friction will be accentuated as structural economic heterogeneity and social stratification increase. This allows for a wide range of reactions, which can often be observed simultaneously. Against the backdrop of a chronic development crisis, also known as “*downgrading*,” cultural conflicts will inevitably become entrenched, and often turn into a militant confrontation over the organization of the public domain, and consequently into a public and highly political incident. A *Clash of Culture* in the real sense occurs: a conflict over different options for organizing public affairs. Cultural conflicts will then look more and more like power struggles, which ultimately are constitutional struggles, since they deal with fundamental questions regarding the future order of society. As an example we may cite the conflict over theocratic vs. secular orientations in Islamic countries, or hybrid mixtures of both (“God’s state as the Republic”), as has been the case in Iran for the past few years.¹¹

Cultural struggles of this kind reveal an existential identity crisis that takes the form of conflicts over power. Heterogeneity of culture and consciousness is then not only observable at a social level or in certain social classes, but in particular within the individual him/herself. These developments bear no resemblance to the post-modern, playful indifference characteristics of a cultural *globalization de luxe*. In extreme cases, such conflicts (e.g. Algeria, Iran) turn into lethal struggles.

It is therefore preferable, as is the case in the economic (and general) discussion on globalization, to specify the different contexts and to consciously differentiate between the characteristics. However, it is also necessary to pay attention to the mutual dependency of cultural and economical profiles within the respective, typically conflict-ridden, contexts.

3. Conclusions for a Productive Intercultural Dialogue

What conclusions can be drawn from these concise observations for intercultural dialogue, which is frequently considered all but unavoidable?

The currently observable signs of economic and cultural globalization and profound social change in developing societies worldwide awaken memories of the comparable, yet largely forgotten, experiences of Europe. Around 1750, social mobilization turned Europe, or more precisely, Northern and Western Europe, into a cradle of a dramatic modernization momentum and triggered the corresponding intellectual upheaval, accompanied by profound conflicts over the social and political order, as well as cultural clashes, as described above.

Hence, the current political, socio-economic and socio-cultural changes taking place in developing societies look familiar to observers aware of the history of European development. Similar to what once occurred in Europe, a dramatic *social mobilization* can be observed worldwide: whole societies become de-ruralized or, rather, urbanized, literacy spreads, political activity grows and initially apolitical populations become increasingly open to political organization. This leads, from a secular point of view, to a pluralism of progressively growing political class interests and identities, and further, to the modern question of coexistence: Which binding institutional measures are applied and *accepted as legitimate* in a pluralistic society in order to deal peacefully with the inevitable, always politicized, conflicts? This problem weighed heavily on European modern history, and it is exactly this problem that today characterizes political conflicts in significant parts of the non-European world.¹²

It is important to emphasize that the politically virulent cultural identity crisis experienced in many developing societies around the world (including regions formerly adhering to “real socialism” of the Eastern European brand) cannot be overcome by exclusively seeking solutions in indigenous traditions, nor by simply embracing foreign models - although both can be observed occasionally. Just like 1750s Europe, a solution is only possible through compromise emerging from political conflict. Such compromises, which are conditioned by balances of power, will have to be demanded from those empowered by the status quo, since they typically are *changes against their will*. Events in Europe did not come about

any differently: none of the achievements *now* considered as fundamental for the structure and formation of public order in Europe and the Western World (the protection of individual basic rights, legal equality, separation of religion and state etc.) were effective principles in the pre-modern European political system. Similar to the notion of tolerance, they are all quite late products of civic development in our own Western hemisphere.¹³

Concerning Europe, the following should be remembered: The civility in dealing with modern social conflicts that can be observed in European core countries was never “imprinted in the genes” of the Old Europe cultural heritage. It is the result of conflicts that lasted decades, even centuries. In Southern Europe, civic achievements of modern political cultures became the basis of the political order only after the fascist regimes in Portugal and Spain, and the military regime in Greece, ended. In Eastern and Middle Europe and in the Baltic such changes occurred after the collapse of real socialism. And in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the organizational principles of modern political systems and their cultural contents at present are often mere facades, always at risk of a relapse at any moment.

He who considers European culture, and in particular its pluralistic political culture, as a consequence of a conflictive, often convulsive, *collective learning process*, will rarely, in the face of socio-political conflicts elsewhere, assume a holistic and essentialist approach, or infer homogenous cultural profiles (such as “Asian / Islamic values”). On the contrary: for some time now, we have seen how non-European cultures - as a reflex to conspicuous socio-economical change and the resulting political conflicts - have shown signs of internal conflict, gravitating toward stratification, to a differentiation of class and mentality, and became aware and auto-reflexive of these developments. If dealt with in a sensible manner, this “*clash within civilizations*” facilitates intercultural dialogue, especially if the European (Western) history of conflicts, as well as a realistic self-image, is kept in mind.¹⁴ Regarding the last premise, it would be helpful if Europeans (or Westerners) would remember the following points: ¹⁵

- That pre-modern, *Old-European* societies, which existed until the 19th and partially up to the 20th century, were rooted in exactly those corporative-collective values based on class and estates that are nowadays considered *anti-Western* elsewhere. What is today propagated as “Asian values” are simply values that are typical for traditional societies and could consequently, at a certain point in time, have been equally well described as Andalusian, Swabian, Anatolian, Nipponese, Punjabi and so forth;
- That the affirmation of *all* human beings are born free and equal concerning dignity and rights, which fortunately today is a principle included in all declarations of basic and human rights, was considered a strange and absurd idea in those days, as documented beyond any doubt by the contemporary legal system;
- That the abstract individual (i.e. the individual regardless of class, gender, race, age, intelligence and so forth, *which does not exist in real life*) as a legal subject was not known and therefore did not exist as a legal figure. Only after numerous political and mainly constitutional arguments did it develop into the epitome of the modern legal order;
- That gender equality before the law, let alone in real life, was never even entertained as an abstract idea;
- That freedom of religion as a basic right was unknown for a long time, and later became an issue of controversy, and was vehemently rejected even by the reformatory confessions. It was not until the 1960s that the Catholic Church (with the Second Vatican Council) accepted this basic right;¹⁶
- That tolerance was dismissed in Old Europe, for it was considered a value that would turn the world against Christianity (tolerance as the root of the anti-Christian world, “the firstborn of all abominations”);¹⁷
- That the fracturing of Christianity into confessions led to a militant intolerance (apart from a few intent on building bridges, the Irenics) which was considered

routine and unproblematic not only on the side of the counter-reformation, but also among the reformatory confessions, who on several occasions established the theocratic, self-assured and explicitly intolerant political entities of Zwinglian and Calvinist providence reminiscent of the Taliban regime. These were partially established also in the English colonies of North America, which were founded by people who originally escaped from Old Europe fleeing religious persecution as a result of militant intolerance;

- That minorities – heretics, pagans and Jews (not to mention Muslims) and women labeled as witches – were not entitled to leniency or compassion, that censorship and paternalism of the spirit were part of daily routine, and that freedom of science as we know it today did not exist;
- That according to a common understanding in those days, human beings did not actually possess rights, but were responsible for certain duties within the community they belonged to. These duties were enforced by a “police force” (responsible for professional, moral, home and economic facets) which was later converted into a “police science,” and can be viewed as the predecessor of modern political science;
- That morals and virtues, duties and customs anchored in communities had the task of orienting human beings onto the path of a largely predetermined and *socially defined* heteronym morality, since a code of ethics based on the autonomous individual was unknown then or, more precisely, was rejected and fought against where and when it was demanded; and
- That the modern notion of the individual as an autonomous subject -, as opposed to the Old European principle founded on the concept of man who, as a primarily socio-moral being, has to be incorporated into a patronizing public order - symbolized a seminal change in Europe, a change that resembled a *cultural revolution*, which proved inevitable in the wake of the processes of modernization and social change.

While Old Europe was familiar with the notion of a binding, stately and secure social idea as expressed in different types of feudalism and the cameral - mercantile *Ancien Régime*, it was only with the rise of the middle-class market society *and* the gradual establishment of a proletarian basis that the individual was forced to fend for him/herself.¹⁸ This change and transition was a consequence of the anti-feudal bourgeoisie, and later on, the anti-bourgeois proletarian movements that triggered liberating impulses. But they also provoked reactionary resistance, as well as intellectual and political movements leading to theocratic counterrevolutions. Their old *topoi*, which have meanwhile faded in Europe, can now be found in many developing societies: defensive criticism against individualism, liberalism and secularism, the degeneration of tradition and culture as perceived by this criticism, against plurality and tolerance as the birth place of social anomy and moral disorientation and corruption.¹⁹

These *topoi* are apparent at the very heart of Germany's history of thought and culture, relevant to political groups and movements *well into the 20th century*. In light of debates fortunately since surmounted over "German values" -- supposed to be antagonistic to the values of Western enlightenment and Anglo-Saxon pragmatism ("culture versus civilization"); and in light of past cultural-political pleas for a "German Authority State" -- in contrast to the subversive pluralism of Western political order (a very vivacious and prominently pursued call until the 1920s) - it should not be difficult for Germans to grasp the context of the current public debates over values emerging in non-European countries, and to understand the political relevance of such debates.

These debates reflect today, as they did in recent European history, problems in the development process, and in particular, ill-directed development.²⁰ The old and recently exhumed debate about "Slavic values" in Russia, the cultural conflict between the "Westerners" and the Slavophiles, should be read as a reflex to chronic and unsolved social problems. Such defensive reactions are typically grounded in (essentially similar, if locally colored) anti-Western projections, or "Occidentalisms," the reverse image of "Orientalism," which comprises generalizing projections of the West regarding non-European societies.²¹

Thus Europeans (and Westerners) should keep their own history in mind when they participate in intercultural dialogue. They should be aware that comparable debates in

Europe preceded many of the politically motivated cultural debates taking place worldwide today. These cultural struggles are neither unfamiliar nor new, if our own European history is taken into account. Approaching the dialogue from this angle can lead to “miracles” in discourse, as it protects against an often unconscious essentialization of a late phase of European (Western) culture. This essentialization deems European culture and *modern* attitudes to values and principles of organizing the public domain to be essentially one and the same. The approach suggested here prevents any such essentialization of other cultures passing through similar transitions, and works against any Herderian perception of others as quasi-monadic entities. In essence, every cultural debate that begins with essentialized perceptions of the self and the other will lead to a dead end, especially if such a debate is laden with political undertones. A fruitful cultural dialogue requires knowledge about the struggle over paradigms, which are characteristic of the history of every cultural field, and in particular all world religions.²²

As for the non-European partners to such a dialogue, it is fundamental that they do not assume the role of representatives of culture and religion, and that they resist all attempts to be presented as such, because the current profound and acute cultural conflicts within all cultures also imply that such “representative representatives” do not really exist. What can be observed are people representing different trends, which are, in varying degrees and numbers, present and struggling with each other in all structurally heterogeneous cultures: the traditionalists and the modernists, the theocrats and the secularists, the conservatives and the postmodernists, the enlighteners and the anti-enlighteners, the progressives and the reactionaries, the universalists and the communitarians, the non-believers and the fundamentalists, the supporters of the status-quo and the dissidents. Their differences are usually not found in specific, non-exchangeable and non-negotiable cultural contents. Rather, these controversial and often antagonistic positions reflect *analogous* socio-economic and socio-political problems, problems that are results of modernization processes and which cut across cultural realms - and which also require *analogous* courses of action to handle and master them. This process, which is today taking place outside of Europe, is unfolding in ways very similar to what happened previously in Europe.

Such positions are thus primarily determined by context-specific and historical components, and are by no means exclusively culture-specific - which explains how

comparable conflict constellations, including cultural standpoints, exist beyond historical periods and specific cultures. Hence, the arguments used by militant and theocratic Islamists are identical to those advanced after 1789 by the theocratic counterrevolution in reaction against a secular state à la française²³ - interestingly enough, without any prior acknowledgment of the latter by the former. Scriptualism as a principle is shared by orthodoxies of all kinds worldwide. Similar to what occurred in Europe once upon a time, attempts at deconstructing “holy texts” in a climate of highly politicized cultural conflicts is leading to the withdrawal of teaching licenses, in particular in Islamic countries. In the worst cases, physical attacks have made exile the only means to save life and limb. Arguments brought forward against the introduction of the right of women to vote or run for office remain as unimaginative and obscure as they were in the past.²⁴ These and other examples prove well enough that history repeats itself more readily than we realize in this vibrant day and age, where history is quickly discarded and forgotten.

Therefore, whoever tries to initiate intercultural dialogue these days should take the real existing cultural worlds into account, and should not set out from the fiction of homogenous cultures. Furthermore, the fact that analogous conflict constellations re-emerge throughout history should be considered and made *an integral part of the dialogue itself*. First and foremost, this requires the removal of certain self-imposed clichés and limitations of thought, and it entails, above all, expanding the intellectual horizon regarding history and a globally oriented comparative analysis.²⁵ Doing so would help to avoid the stale and largely counter-productive routine of many well-intended intercultural dialogues that are frequently merely abstract meta-dialogues. Reframed in this fashion, intercultural dialogues could be transformed into important contributions toward an emerging cultural globality, characterized by manifold, internecine cross-relations.

The basic question haunting this globality, the problem of *old and new*, might be summarized as follows: *Pluralization* and *plurality* of individual societies and the world as a whole constitute the *principal challenge*. *Tolerance and coexistence*, both the result of collective learning experiences always subject to relapse, are *the constructive answer to work toward*. Intercultural dialogue, if *oriented in a sensible way*, may be of great help in the search for numerous, context-specific answers, as well as the more general solutions emerging in the process.²⁶

In summary, there are a number of evident pointers for an intercultural dialogue that may contribute to policies for peace:

- It is necessary to contextualize the politically relevant articulation of culture - their embeddedness in specific contexts of action - which calls for an analysis of the specific societal formation in which they emerge, and include its interrelations with the global environment.
- It is furthermore indispensable to take into account the ambiguities, incoherencies and inner conflicts already apparent in most *traditional* cultures. The Old Testament not only pleads to “beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks” (Isaiah 2, 4), it also pleads for the opposite: “Beat your plowshares into swords, and your pruning hooks into spears.” (Joel 3, 10)! Traditional Chinese philosophy, which essentially reflected on very practical approaches for the maintenance of public order, was characterized not only by controversy, but even by antagonistic positions. Facts like these, which are also observable elsewhere, usually remain underexposed in the framework of intercultural dialogue. A realistic cultural picture therefore needs to be developed much earlier, i.e. at the foundation of the respective traditional culture. This aspect would also prevent any essentialization of culture.²⁷
- Another aspect to bear in mind is that culture, and specifically religion, only become politically relevant when their demands are inserted into the political decision-making processes, i.e. are integrated into the current processes of the political system and thus gain political significance.²⁸ Intercultural dialogue will typically engage such politicized forms of culture and religion, and with fewer imputed “original” articulations of the self, which are frequently interpreted in controversial ways.
- Hence, a productive intercultural dialogue will always find itself maneuvering within those controversies and conflicts that the various cultural circles and currents wage against each other, as well as amongst each other. Thus, changes in the self-perception of certain cultures and conflicts over paradigms will likewise become the object of dialogue.

- A historically anchored and comparative observation of reality is imperative for intercultural dialogue. To neglect a historic and comparative orientation threatens to turn dialogues into a routine of exchanges which might be well-intended, but which remain devoid of consequences or which lead to a dead end, to a dialogue of the deaf who have nobody to blame but themselves.

Translated from German by Muna El-Khawad.

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NOTES

- ¹ Cf. Dieter Senghaas: *Die Konstitution der Welt – eine Analyse in friedenspolitischer Absicht*. In: Leviathan 31 (2003), pages 117-152.
- ² Dieter Senghaas: *Zum irdischen Frieden*, Frankfurt a.M. 2004, Chapter 6.
- ³ *Ibid.*, Chapter 9.
- ⁴ A detailed analysis regarding structural heterogeneity is available in Dieter Senghaas: *Weltwirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik. Plädoyer für Dissoziation*, Frankfurt a.M. 1977.
- ⁵ Main contributions of the mentioned authors, as well as others, were published in Dieter Senghaas (Ed.): *Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt. Analysen über abhängige Reproduktion*, Frankfurt a.M. 1972; idem (Ed.): *Peripherer Kapitalismus. Analysen über Abhängigkeit und Unterentwicklung*, Frankfurt a.M. 1974; idem (Ed.): *Kapitalistische Weltökonomie. Kontroversen über ihren Ursprung und ihre Entwicklungsdynamik*, Frankfurt a.M. 1979.
- ⁶ Globalization *avant la lettre* and in its current manifestations is enlighteningly analyzed by Osvaldo Sunkel and Michael Mortimore: *Transnational Integration and National Disintegration Revisited*. In: Björn Hettne, András Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (Eds.): *Comparing Regionalisms. Implications for Global Development*, London 2001, pages 54-92.
- ⁷ Consult, among a large wealth of literature on the subject, Bernd Wagner (Ed.): *Kulturelle Globalisierung. Zwischen Weltkultur und kultureller Fragmentierung*, Essen 2001.
- ⁸ An early analysis available by Hans Bosse: *Sozio-kulturelle Faktoren von Unterentwicklung. Überwindung von Unterentwicklung als Lernprozeß*. In: *DGFK-Informationen* (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung), Special edition II, Bonn 1974, pages 33-44.
- ⁹ Mark Juergensmeyer: *Terror in the Mind of God. The Global Rise of Religious Violence*, Berkeley 2000; Martin Riesebrodt: *Die Rückkehr der Religionen. Fundamentalismus und der Kampf der Kulturen*, München 2000; Henner Fürtig (Ed.): *Islamische Welt und Globalisierung. Aneignung – Abgrenzung – Gegenentwürfe*, Würzburg 2001; Thomas Scheffler (Ed.): *Religion between Violence and Reconciliation*, Beirut 2002; Harald Barrios, and Andreas Boeckh (Eds.): *Resistance to Globalization. A Comparison of Three World Cultures*, New York 2003.
- ¹⁰ Klaus-Georg Riegel: ‚Asiatische Werte‘ – *Die Asiatisierungsdebatte im Kontext der Globalisierung*. In: *Zeitschrift für Politik* 48 (2001), pages 397-425; Manfred Mols: *Bemerkungen zur Globalisierung in Ost- und Südostasien*. *Ibid.*, pages 427-447. Also Peter Birle, Jörg Faust, Günther Maihold and Jürgen Rüländ: *Globalisierung und Regionalismus. Bewährungsproben für Staat und Demokratie in Asien und Lateinamerika*, Opladen 2002.
- ¹¹ Gudrun Krämer: *Gottes Staat als Republik. Reflexionen zeitgenössischer Muslime zu Islam, Menschenrechten und Demokratie*, Baden-Baden 1999.
- ¹² Consult Chapter 2 of the book mentioned in endnote 2.
- ¹³ Dieter Senghaas: *Zivilisierung wider Willen. Der Konflikt der Kulturen mit sich selbst*, Frankfurt a.M. 1998.
- ¹⁴ For the importance of such a realistic self-image not only for intercultural dialogue, but also for the further development of Europe, see Emanuel Richter: *Das republikanische Europa. Aspekte einer nachholenden Zivilisierung*, Opladen 1999.
- ¹⁵ Regarding the following list of facts, consult Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde: *Vom Wandel des Menschenbildes im Recht* (Gerda Henkel-Vorlesung), Münster 2001.

- ¹⁶ Especially informative is Hans Maier: *Wie universal sind die Menschenrechte?*, Freiburg 1997.
- ¹⁷ For the following cf.: Henry Kamen: *Intoleranz und Toleranz zwischen Reformation und Aufklärung*, München 1967.
- ¹⁸ Ernst - Wolfgang Böckenförde, op. cit. (cf. endnote 15).
- ¹⁹ An excellent contribution can be found in Christoph Marx: *Fundamentalismus und Nationalstaat*. In: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 27 (2001) pages 87-117; also Wolfgang Reinhard (Ed.): *Die fundamentalistische Revolution*, Freiburg 1995; Martin Riesebrodt: *Die fundamentalistische Erneuerung der Religionen*. In: *WeltTrends*, Number 30, Spring 2001, pages 9-27.
- ²⁰ Regarding the German debate, refer to Paul Nolte: *Die Ordnung der deutschen Gesellschaft. Selbstentwurf und Selbstbeschreibung im 20. Jahrhundert*, München 2000; Stefan Breuer: *Ordnungen der Ungleichheit. Die deutsche Rechte im Widerstreit ihrer Ideen 1871-1945*, Darmstadt 2001. Especially informative for the debate about "German values," i.e. an orientation on "culture" versus "civilization" is the controversy between the brothers Thomas und Heinrich Mann: Thomas Mann: *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (1918), Frankfurt a.M. 2001 as well as Thomas Mann/Heinrich Mann: *Briefwechsel 1900-1949*, Frankfurt a.M. 1995 (Paperback edition).
- ²¹ Ian Buruma und Avishai Margalit: „Okzidentalismus“ oder *Der Hass auf den Westen*. In: *Merkur* 56 (2002) pages 277-288. A fundamental examination of Orientalism, in this case related to Eastern Asia, can be found in Eun-Jeung Lee: „*Anti-Europa*“. *Die Geschichte der Rezeption des Konfuzianismus und der konfuzianischen Gesellschaft seit der Aufklärung*, Münster 2003. See also Heiner Bielefeldt: *Philosophie der Menschenrechte*, Darmstadt 1998.
- ²² The transformation of paradigms in the development of world religions is presented in an exemplary manner by Hans Küng: *Das Christentum. Wesen und Geschichte*, München 1994; idem: *Das Judentum. Die religiöse Situation der Zeit*, München 1991; idem: *Der Islam*, München 2004.
- ²³ See the description of post revolutionary France by Johann Baptist Müller: *Religion und Politik*, Berlin 1997, Chapter IV as well as Sadik J. Al-Azm: *Unbehagen in der Moderne. Aufklärung im Islam*, Frankfurt a.M. 1993.
- ²⁴ For a background on this problematic consult Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris: *The True Clash of Civilizations*. In: *Foreign Policy*, March/April 2003, pages 63-70.
- ²⁵ Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby: *The Glory and the Power: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the Modern World*, Boston 1992.
- ²⁶ Philosophical point of view by Ram Adhar Mall: *Philosophie im Vergleich der Kulturen*, Darmstadt 1995; Heinz Kimmerle: *Interkulturelle Philosophie zur Einführung*, Hamburg 2002; Franz Martin Wimmer: *Interkulturelle Philosophie. Eine Einführung*, Wien 2004; from a political science perspective consult Harald Müller: *Das Zusammenleben der Kulturen. Ein Gegenentwurf zu Huntington*, Frankfurt a.M. 1998, as well as the book cited in endnote 13.
- ²⁷ Refer to the detailed and comparative analysis I undertook in my book cited in endnote 13.
- ²⁸ Conditions that render a political topic or controversial issue relevant for politics are explained by Ernst-Otto Czempiel: *Internationale Politik*, Paderborn 1981.